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Colonial Cases

Blum Bros. v. Leroy, 1867

[guarantee]

Blum Bros. v. Leroy

United States Consular Court, China
31 January 1867
Source: The North-China Herald, 6 June 1867

 

U.S. CONSULAR COURT.

Before W. P. MANGUM, Esq., U.S. Consul-General.

May 21st 1867

BLUM BROS. v. D. LEROY by C. H. Angel, Trustee.

JUDGMENT.

The judgment having been given in this case on the 31st of January 1867, by Consul General Seward as follows:-

Upon fuller consideration and a more accurate knowledge of thr facts, I am of the opinion that the guarantee alleged by the defendant though extremely probable, is not sustainable in law.  The accounts should be made up therefore, accepting the balance admitted by Leroy (original defendant,) as due on the 1st Dec. 1863, and the amount of Taels 4,587.26 as the sum actually realized on the sale to Limby.  Interest should be credited as well as debited and commissions charged on both receipts and expenditures at 2 ½ pee cent - Costs by defendant's trustee.

GEO. F. SEWARD.

The Court met to receive and pass the report of the accountant to whom the accounts had been submitted for final examination.

The report being presented showed a difference of Taels 180, less than the previous one.  The Counsel for both plaintiffs and defendant accepted this difference.

The Counsel for defendant then moved that an appeal be taken on the ground that the judgment was not intended at the time it was rendered to be final, and that the officer who gave it, did not sit with associates.

The Counsel for the plaintiff objected to this motion and argued that the judgment was final; and so intended to be at the time it was rendered, and only delayed from being carried into effect in order to have the accounts passed upon, and the mistakes supposed likely to exist in them adjusted - that no intimation whatever has been given within the time allowed by the rules of the Court, of an intention to appeal, although the Counsel for the Defendant was well aware of said judgment, - that this case has been before the Court for more than three years, - that several sittings of the Court have been held - that associates were present at these sittings about passing, and that, if as was alleged, no associates were present at the last sitting, no objection was raised at such sitting - that by waiving the objection then, the action of the Court was accepted, and consequently they have no right to raise the objection now.

The objection to the motion being considered vapid by the Court was sustained, and the judgment, with the difference in the accounts of Taels 180 - as reported and accepted by both parties, ordered to be carried into effect.

Published by Centre for Comparative Law, History and Governance at Macquarie Law School