Pedder C.J., 12 and 14 September 1825

Solicitor-General. - May it please your Honor.  I am now to bring forward a subject, than which it is almost impossible that one more important in itself, in every point of view, can be brought before any Court, in any community.  Upon the dignity and the honour, upon the integrity and the purity, unsullied and unsuspected of the legal Profession, depend the vital interests of every society.  Motives may be strictly honest, integrity may exist, but if a practice prevails in itself impure, dangerous in its tendency, a practice which places suitors of the Court completely within the power of the Profession, it is essential that that practice should be entirely put an end to.  There is no body of men in any country, but I apprehend especially in a small one constituted as this, the members of which are more completely in the power of the legal Profession; it is therefore absolutely essential that that Profession, collectively and individually, should be positively pure; that no practice should obtain which should tend to encrease that truly dangerous power they at present possess.  If any practice obtains which enables Attornies to compromise or betray the interests of their clients, it must cease.  The purity of the Profession must be beyond suspicion.  I apprehend it is the duty of a professional man not only to advise his client, when papers are laid before him, but also to enter as fully into his feelings as the client would do himself; he must know no man but his client; to attend to his interest, to take no step, to listen to no confidence which can in any manner tend to a hostile feeling on his part.  He is bound to attend to his interests to their utmost extent, to take every possible step which can inure to his benefit.  He is entitled to his clients' complete confidence, without which, unlimitedly, he cannot do him justice.  He is bound therefore to take advantage of every possible circumstance which may arise in the course of a case, which may by any means benefit his client, and he is also bound to place himself in no situation which may lead him to have his interests in any way divided.  Now the duty of an Advocate is not merely to advise his client and to address the Jury in Court, but to take charge of all proceedings out of Court; for frequently on the pleadings and form of action, depends much of the success of a cause; and in all cases he is bound to take every advantage, even of any accidental slips, which can tend to his clients benefit.  Again, the client must lay before his adviser every act; he must not conceal anything even to his own prejudice; because upon the fair statement which he gives, the action will depend.  The defendant must do exactly the same, to draw an answer to the declaration; in the course of a case it is essential to the client even who has the best case, to keep back from the knowledge of the opposite side, the particular circumstances of his defence, upon which he trusts for success.  If therefore any client exposes his situation to the adversary, he is in imminent danger.  Thus then, as the form of the pleadings is of the greatest importance, if both be placed in the same hands, the direct tendency of such a practice is to prolong litigation, and to sacrifice the interest of the suiters.  I understand that the practice of drawing pleadings on both sides is to be justified, that a high authority is to be quoted, which I cannot believe.  I cannot think he can have taken fees on both sides.  Who is the man on whom success depends?  Why the Advocate; and will any man tell me that if the Practitioner even be pure, that the practice can itself be tolerated!  I say that whatever notions may be attributed to the individual who stands forth to reprobate this practice, that it is essential the dangerous powers now in the hands of the Profession should be limited, and that nothing should be endured which places the Public more particularly in their hands.  Let any man suppose what his feelings would be under the circumstances which I shall now suppositiously put.  A merchant has a claim, which he finds replete with difficulties; he resorts to a Practitioner on whose talents he depends; does he do so only to draw the pleadings and address a Jury?  He has besides a variety of other duties to perform - the little arrangements of the case - to frame his statements so as to ensure it success as far as he can.  Let us suppose that Advocate has been already consulted by the opposite party, he has given his advice against him, and he has received his fee; have not both parties a right to expect that he would tell them the state of the case, that he should say, I must support one of you, I have advised one against the other, and how can I assist both.  Will any man tell me that this Practiser can be impartial?  That he can one day do all he can for one side, and the next day for the other?  If so, there will be no occasion for more than one Practitioner in this Court.  It is not in human nature that man should be perfect, or entirely pure.  If a man has both sides before him, he cannot but adopt a preference.

The Chief Justice. - It appears to me, that the question all depends as to what is the engagement of the Advocate who is employed to draw a pleading.  Is not there a new engagement made with every new proceeding laid before a Special Pleader?

Solicitor-General. - I submit to your Honor this consideration, what would be the feelings of a man who should find that the Advocate on whom he placed his whole reliance, had taken a fee and given advice on the other side, to defeat that very claim as to which he originally consulted his advocate!  I will admit, that in England, where there are Gentlemen educated expressly as Special Pleaders or Equity Draftsmen, and who draw perhaps 2000 please and declarations in a-year, this may be; but even that practice, I contend is most dangerous.  The motives of a man may be as pure as Heaven itself, but if such a practice prevails in any community, in a profession upon whose exertions every thing dear to the suitor depends, it is perfectly possible that a Pleader who has nothing to do with the conduct of a cause in Court, may draw the plea when he has drawn the declaration, but I do not believe that the practice, if known, would be tolerated, and I am certain, that if once the practice was brought before the Court, it would be most severely reprobated.  In amicable suits, this practice may be permitted, -- as between father and son perhaps, who have agreed upon facts, they are singly desirous of raising a naked point for the decision of the Court.  And then, I apprehend the practice may be permitted; but even in these cases, where it is more tolerated than permitted, the person who draws the Bill, cannot put his name to the answer; he sends it to a friend who does so.  But I will assert that the conscientious part of the Bar refuse to conduct both sides of these amicable suits.  So much for the determined and resolute purity which prevails elsewhere. --  Let it not be supposed I mean to throw any slur upon the Profession, or that I charge them, or any one of them, with deliberate dishonour or dishonesty, but I put it as I would do was I addressing them, to their feelings for the interests of the community, whether, if once practices such as these are brought under their consideration, whether they ought not to stand forward with purity, and say, we admit the practice is wrong, and that it ought to be put an end to.  And let the Public (I would say, was I addressing that Public), support that Advocate who has the honour and the boldness to stand forward to reprobate a practice replete with danger to the community.  But it is possible that expressions may be made, ridicule may be resorted to, motives may be traduced for the purpose of private malignity, or of screening an individual for purposes hostile to the community.  But if that were the case, I should say that the Public lost sight of its own essential interests; that it was lending its own hand to plant a dagger in its own heart; and that if that Public assented to any thing like impropriety on the part of this Profession, they placed themselves in an awful situation, in which they may be one day sacrificed.  Will any man tell me that he who stands forward to put an end to a practice, which tends to introduce impurities of all kinds into professional practice, does not confer a benefit upon Society at large?  If the thing be wrong, it should certainly be instantly put an end to.  If it be held that this practice is right, farewell to the hopes of securing justice, and that obtained in the shortest and the least expensive manner.  Let me not be supposed to have introduced this with unnecessary gravity, for although I have thrown no imputation upon motives, yet if the practice be saturated with danger to the community, it is a grave subject deserving of all solemnity.  I found upon the affidavits which I have, a motion against His Majesty's Attorney-General.  The charges are brought forward by myself, the second Member of the Profession, and they are not lightly to be got rid of, nor is the Court to be lightly addressed upon them.  But it is possible that when an individual steps forward to enter his protest, to raise his hands and his voice against practices which appear to him to be highly improper and ruinous to Society, instead of meeting with support, he may have to encounter the most deadly opposition.  Ridicule and slander may be resorted to, to prejudice him, because he boldly chuses to stand forward, and to attempt the abrogation of practices which he never will acquiesce in.  It is possible that the very community, whose interests he is advocating, may chuse to surround him with dangers, instead of lending him their support.  But although the whole community was set in array against me,  I would disregard it, I would hope for better times when pure motives were properly valued, and the Public not be disgracefully led away by any one man, or any set of men under Heaven!  I am sensible if a practice be bad, it must be put down by the arm of power, and not by private consent amongst the Profession.  But the man who stands forth thus, must meet some little danger, and I am aware that I stand in no very pleasant situation.  If from want of due attention to the subject, the practice has obtained, let the Profession come forward and state, that however pure the motives of the parties have been, that the sooner it is got rid of the better.  I am supported, even although the whole Profession and the whole world should oppose me, by my own feelings of propriety; and I will tell the Public, and those amongst them who know not what principle is, that it is that which holds one up with pride, with inward satisfaction, even with positive pleasure.  But it it is held here, that circumstances such as the affidavits before me disclose, are professional and proper, another Public will draw its own conclusions.  I say then, that the case has been brought forward by me, and by me it shall never be abandoned.  I attack not the motives, but the practice - the Public here may not give me credit for sincerity, but another Public will.  I am given to understand, that by bringing forward this question, my life may be the sacrifice!  I care not!  I am reckless even of that, because it becomes the man who has once embarked, to go on heedless of all sneers, despising all attempts at low sarcasm, every possible effort of ungenerous notice, all threats of personal danger, and that feeling himself to have done that which every Member of the Profession is bound to do in such cases, that consciousness will carry me though triumphant!  I am now about to state that which may excite the jeers of petty spite, the little witticisms of contemptible malice, I heed it not, because I care only for the opinions of my private friends, and I have very few of those.  Yet I declare, that as a British Barrister, with the education of one, and the feelings which birth also gives, I would abandon this country and seek a happier clime, even under a scorching sun or the most deadly pestilence - where honourable motives would be understood, and where I might obtain some honourable pittance, without being a participator in practice, against which I enter my solemn voice, and that I may never be disgraced by practising in a country where things like these may be tolerated, and where, supported by my own feelings, I could be happier than I can ever be here.  Perhaps as far as private comfort depends, I may repent having now so done my duty.  But I know that whatever may be done here, a very strong torrent will flow elsewhere, and that the hearts of our common countrymen will thrill when these facts are known to them, and my conduct there will receive general applause.  I have now to request that the officer of the Court may read the affidavits.

Mr. Stephen's affidavit was read first.  It set forth, that being employed by Mr. Laurie, in an action against Griffiths, he signed judgment by default; that the Attorney-General was with him in this case, and advised the default to be withdrawn, on the grounds that pleading would not injure the plaintiff's case; that long pleas were put in.  That also in a cause, Pitcairn v. Lord, the Attorney-General gave an opinion to Pitcairn and acted for Lord; also, in the case of Simons v. Atkinson.  That in the case Laurie v. Griffiths, the Solicitor-General has himself the pleas drawn by the Attorney-General.

Mr. Dawes's affidavit stated, that he retained the Attorney-General for Atkinson; that the Attorney-General drew the plea for Simons; that the Attorney-General was retained for Bethune and Grant, and that the Attorney-General was consulted by them in an action against Loane, in which he advised them, and that soon afterwards a Bill in Equity was filed against them by Loane, and that the Attorney-General has drawn their answer; and that he has learnt from the Attorney-General himself, that the Bill was drawn by him; that the Attorney-General was directed by the Governor to defend Griffiths, at the suit of Laurie, at the expense of Government; and that nevertheless he has charged Griffiths with fees.

Mr. Laurie's affidavit stated, that he consulted the Attorney-General; that he received advice from him to bring an action, and to lay his damages at £2000; that the Attorney-General had three or four consultations with him and with his witnesses, and that the Attorney-General settled the [decla]ration; that Mr. Stephen recorded default; that he had several consultations with the Attorney-General at Mr. Murray's house; that by the advice of the Attorney-General the defendants were admitted to plead.

The Solicitor-General then moved, the Attorney-General be called upon to answer the matters stated in these affidavits.

The Chief-Justice. - I apprehend that a Barrister in England is, to a certain degree, independent of the Court in which he practises.  If he was guilty of practises grossly fraudulent, or in direct contravention of its standing orders, then of course he would be amenable to its decisions.  But whether in the cases as are before us, where he has been applied to, to draw pleadings on both sides a case, whether the Court would take notice of it I doubt.  I have endeavoured to find any similar cases, but I have met with none.  The next consideration is, how then would a Barrister be dealt with in England?  He is a Graduate at Law, and his degree gives him a right to be heard in the King's Court, not a private Court, such as Courts Palatine, &c., but by courtesy they are permitted to be heard there.  The question then is, that unless practice is objected to them, which would be a contempt of these Courts, I do not see how they are amenable.  I apprehend the only tribunal where redress exists, is where the degree emanated from.  Considering how Barristers stand in England, only contraventions of standing orders of the Courts, or manifest and direct fraud, which I apprehend is a contempt of a high nature, is that which the Court would punish as they would all others.  But in our case it is perfectly different, the only right which persons practising here have to act here, is under the express provisions of an Act of Parliament, enabling the Judge to admit them.  English Barristers coming here leave all their privileges in England behind them; because no man, of whatever standing he may be, has a right to walk in here and practice.  The license therefore to practice here depends upon a different tenure, and will induce the Court here to treat as contempt, practices which would not perhaps be otherwise considered so.  A [Barris]ter at home is admitted here only quasi [Bar]rister; he has no right extrinsic of the Co[lony] and therefore the Court, I apprehend, considers every Barrister practising here, is as much an Officer of the Court as Attornies are at home.  Upon this ground it is, that the Courts would consider persons practising here as amenable for any contempt of its authority; since it is by the authority of the Court here alone by which persons can practice.  I do therefore apprehend that the [manage]ment of the cases of persons confined to them is subject to the visitation of the Court.  I do not wish to pass any opinion as to what is a derilection of duty, whether drawing a declaration and then a plea is such.  In England the drawing pleadings is a separate and distinct branch of the Profession, followed by persons who are generally limited thereto; they are not necessarily admitted in any Court, nor do I know how they are under the orders of the Court.  I believe the only way they are limited is to the taking out a certificate.  I am not aware that a Special Pleader is under any regulations.  He is to be viewed in the same light as would be any other individual exercising his talent for his own advantage.  But here the case is different, because here the power of putting a pleading upon the Files of the Court, depends upon the license obtained from this very Court.  Under these circumstances, I think it will be my duty to grant a Rule, that may call upon the Attorney-General to answer the affidavits.

Attorney-General. - I beg your Honor's pardon for reminding you, that in the Letters of the Solicitor-General to the Governor, he mentions two cases, in which he makes direct charges against me of personal influence.  These charges are now omitted, and I call upon him - I dare him, I say I dare the Solicitor-General to bring them forward.  He has ventured to accuse me of dishonourable practices, and he does not now bring forward his accusations. - I dare him to do so!

The Chief Justice. - It is most painful to me to go into this, but I feel it my duty to explain how the matter has come before me.  I believe both the Gentlemen concerned, will agree with me when I state, that to this moment I do not know, I say I have no distinct substantive charge before me.  I have never known what were the distinct charges which were meant to be conveyed in the Letters alluded to.  The highest power in this island sent certain papers to me, stating that the charges they contained were of a professional nature.  It was the view of the quarter from whence these papers came, that I had the power of investigating them.  But such is not the case.  I have no such power over even the meanest Officer of this Court.  I believe the Attorney-General was willing to consent to such, provided that the Enquiry was made in the face of the whole Profession.  But I could not do so; therefore all I had to do, was to return the papers.  But I felt also, that it was impossible for me, recollecting the state of the parties concerned, I felt that it was my duty to take some steps to put an end to this practice, if it really exists, and is an improper one.  At any rate, I am of opinion that it is only a moral obligation, and not a civil case; and that I have no power to compel any one or other of the parties to proceed otherwise than is at present before the Court.

Solicitor-General. - If your Honor will allow me, I will offer a single observation.  The kind of investigation alluded to, certainly was intended to have been a private one.  I deny that I have carried any circumstances any where.  I have made no charges but what are before the Court, and all that has taken place between the first and second Authorities in the Island is of a very different nature.  The charges alluded to by the Attorney-General, I have not brought forward, owing to some difficulties of proof.

Attorney-General. - No! it is because they were false!

[Solicitor-General. - I had difficulties of] proof.

Attorney-General. - No! they were false!  On Wednesday I shall be quite prepared to answer these affidavits.

The Attorney-General addressed the Court in a speech of two hours continuance; the energy and ability of which, made the most striking impression upon the whole auditory, which consisted of most of the respectable individuals of Hobart Town and the neighbourhood.  Although we are unable to give a faint outline of this most brilliant address, yet it was to the follow effect:--

Before I proceed to shew cause in the motion made against me by the Solicitor-General, it is necessary that I should call your Honor's attention to the address with which it was prefaced, and which I will take upon myself to assert was of a nature unheard of in any country on any occasion - I say unheard of, because it is so: it was a speech not to the Court, but to the passions - not to facts, but to assumptions of his own creating; entirely ad captandum.  It had nothing whatever to do with what it professed to be.  And how was it supported by the affidavits; they were also of a similar description; they did not contain statements of facts, although every thing was within their own reach - every paper and document in their own possession.  What were they, I say? any thing but affidavits to the purpose - altogether inferential, merely as to ``hearing and believing."  Is it the custom of the Courts at home to call upon a Public Officer, and to bring him before this Court and the Public, upon loose charges such as these? was such a circumstance ever before heard of?  I submit to your Honor, that it is without example.  And upon what grounds is this attack upon my character attempted to be supported.  I will call you Honor's attention to the affidavits which the Solicitor-General has produced; and the Court will see upon what loose grounds this motion is founded.  The first affidavit is that of Mr. John Laurie; it is prepared by Mr. Stephen himself, and certain facts, extrinsic to the case, are put in, to bolster it up for obvious purposes.  The Solicitor-General talked of his purity - of his honor--of his principle - that he was like Caesar's wife, devoid of suspicion.  I come not here to impugn his motives, but to defend my own character. - Mr. Laurie commences his affidavit, by a reference to his being advised by Mr. Murray; of this I know nothing; he goes on that he consulted me, and that he gave me a retainer, and that I received it; I did so, because I was bound to do [it].  And although Mr. Stephen prepared the affidavit himself, there he stops: he says I received a fee of five guineas; but he has not the common honour to state, that I returned that very fee to himself, and that he has it now in his pocket.  Mr. Laurie stated, that I recommended him to employ Mr. Murray.  What will your Honor think when I state that I recommended him to employ Mr. Dawes, who is now in league with the Solicitor-General against me, as his attorney; that he did so employ him; that Mr. Dawes took up his case, abandoned it, and went over to the defendants.  He says he consulted with me at Mr. Murray's house; it is false - I never saw him in Mr. Murray's house.  So much for Mr. Laurie's affidavit. - Now we come to Mr. Stephen's - He says, that he was employed by Mr. Laurie as his Attorney, and that he signed a judgment by default; that he advised with me, and that I recommended him to wave it; that he consulted with me, as to his proceedings, relative to the defendant's plea.  Sir, this is false - I gave him no advice.  That he called upon me is true; that he consulted me is totally false.  That he told me the course he meant to adopt, is true, but that I advised him to it, is false.  And how he could have stated this, I know not; because he never produced to me a single paper on which to consult me.  The next case is that of Pitcairn v. Lord, and this is a most extraordinary charge.  If the Solicitor-General had had even a little experience in his Profession before he came here, he never would have made such a charge as this; what is it?  Why, because I held a General Retainer for Mr. Edward Lord, that forsooth, I cannot give any opinion wherever his interests may be concerned.  Now what are the facts.  Mr. Patterson laid before me a case for my opinion.  Mr. Stephen laments that this case is lost.  I do not act as Mr. Solicitor-General does, by such words as ``I think, and I believe," but I come forward fairly and openly; and as he has lost this opinion, I will produce it for him, and your Honor will see, that I have acted as is the universal custom of the Profession at home.  Mr. Stephen has talked of public opinion, and of the people in England; I know what will be the opinion there - that his whole proceedings will be scouted.  He ought to have known the practice at home - he ought to have known, that if a General Retainer is given, it only binds the Counsel that receives it, to act if he receives a brief; but if he is not employed, he is open to the other side.

The Chief Justice. - I presume, Mr. Attorney-General, that if a Counsel has received a retainer, that he cannot act on the other side, without a license, express or implied.

The Attorney-General. - Sir, I have known hundreds of cases, where Sir Samuel Romilly, and other Counsel of the first eminence, have given opinions without any reference to whether a General Retainer has been received or not.  In point of fact, the Counsel himself knows nothing about Retainers - these are all managed by his clerk; and it is well known to every Member of the Profession of any experience, that I have accurately described the established practice. - I now come to the cases of Simons v. Atkinson, and Bethune v. Loane.  And what are the circumstances of this latter case?  I received a General Retainer from Messrs. Bethune and Grant.  A cause was tried in which they were plaintiffs and Mr. Loane defendant.  I also held a General Retainer for Mr. Loane.  The cause was tried, and Messrs. Bethune and Grant obtained a verdict.  Your Honor cannot have forgotten, that on the trial it was your pleasure to make some remark, as to a remedy which the defendant at law had in Equity.

The Chief-Justice. - I perfectly recollect it.  I stated to Mr. Young, that such was certainly his remedy, if he considered he was entitled to any.

The Attorney-General. - On this trial, Messrs. Bethune and Grant were in point of fact mere nominal plaintiffs.  Messrs. Sampson and Prince were the real plaintiffs; and Messrs. Bethune and Grant's names were only made use of, to oust Mr. Loane from his retainer, Messrs. Bethune and Grant having precedence of him.  A Bill in Equity was then determined upon by Mr. Loane; and I should like to know how Mr. Solicitor-General expects, that because I hold their General Retainer, I am not to act in any case in which, although other persons may be parties, yet wherein they may be incidentally concerned.  And it is so in this case; for the Bill is against Sampson and Prince, although Bethune and Grant are introduced merely as stake-holders.  But even here I acted with unnecessary reserve; for I merely put the materials with which I was furnished by Mr. Young into a technical order, without the addition or suppression of one single fact, and this I did principally out of a feeling of good-will towards Mr. Young, who was (from his having been educated in the Scotch Courts, which differ materially from ours) in some degree unacquainted with the English forms.  But I did no more; and this Mr. Young has positively sworn to in an affidavit now on the table of the Court.  I refused to give him any advice; but I told him, as I have also done to every other Gentleman of the Profession, that my library was open to him, but that I could give him no further assistance.  What then becomes of this charge of Mr. Stephen's; and what will the public opinion be of it, of which he speaks so much? - I now come to the notable case of Laurie v. Griffiths.  I have already stated to the Court what became of the fee I received with the retainer, and in whose pocket it now is.  But Mr. Dawes has sworn, in his affidavit, that I have charged him with a retainer in this cause, which most fortunately I have in my possession, and here it is in Mr. Dawes's hand-writing.  This is the retainer, and what does it say, ``Mr. Attorney-General – retainer five guineas;" and yet Mr. Dawes swears I made this charge.  Here, Sir, is the retainer, its speaks for itself.  [The Attorney-General here handed it into the Court.]  But what will the Court think, after Mr. Dawes's affidavit, when I state that I never received one shilling of these five guineas.  Now this is the sum and substance of the affidavits upon which these heavy charges against my character are grounded.  I am quite confident, that if the Solicitor-General had opened this case in England, as he has done here - that if he had spoken to the Public, and not to the Court - if he had produced affidavits such as those on the table - that no Court in England would have granted this Rule.  But I raise no objection on that ground.  I say, that whenever and wherever a breath of suspicion is uttered as to me, that I will be the first to bring it forward, and insist, as I have done in this case, upon the fullest and most public investigation.  I will now, Sir, read my affidavit, as to which I will trouble you with but one remark.  I do not state things from belief and hearsay; but plain, positive, straight-forward facts.  I say, Sir, facts, and nothing else - facts which they cannot - they dare not deny - [The Attorney-General here read his affidavit.  It was of great length, and went fully into the facts of the different cases, and substantially and unequivocally contradicted most of the statements contained in the affidavits produced by the Solicitor-General.  That he drew the plea in Laurie v. Griffiths, solely as an act of friendship for Mr. Dawes; that he returned the five guineas retaining fee to Mr. Stephen, and that although Mr. Dawes states fees are charged, they are marked on the briefs by himself, and in point of fact, he has hitherto not received one shilling from Mr. Dawes of these very fees, which form the subject matter of the present application to the Court.  That he has practised in England from 1809, and that the practice was as he had before described it.  That Mr. Hone, the Master of the Court, had agreed with the Gentlemen of the Profession, that pleadings should be drawn and opinions given without reference to previous retainers.  That in a case, Mason v. Bethune, Mr. Hone drew the bill and the answer, and then appeared in Court as the Counsel.  And that he never knew one syllable as to these charges, or that they were even thought of or in preparation against him, until His Honor the Lieutenant Governor communicated to him that he had received them from Mr. Stephen.]

Mr. Young's affidavit was read, and fully bore out the Attorney-General's statements, as to the case of Bethune and Loane.

Mr. Butler's affidavit was then read, stating that he had practised for eighteen years in England; that the practice of the Profession was as described by the Attorney-General, and that he never knew any objection being made to it.

Mr. Cartwright's affidavit stated, that a meeting took place at Mr. Hone's, the result of which was as stated by the Attorney-General; and that the practice in England was invariably as has been represented.

Mr. Ross's affidavit stated, that he had practised in England since 1811, and that the practice was universally as stated by the Attorney-General.

Mr. Murray's affidavit stated, that Mr Laurie had applied to him to obtain for him professional assistance; that he had recommended him to the Attorney-General; that Mr. Laurie having stated that from want of funds he found difficulty in obtaining professional assistance, he drew the declaration gratuitously for him, and authorized the Registrar of the Court to charge the fee to his private account, and contradicted Mr. Laurie's statement as to the Attorney-General having ever been consulted by him at Mr. Murray's house.

The Chief Justice. - Did the Register admit pleadings to be put on the Records of this Court, by a person not admitted an Attorney.

The Register. -  Mr. Laurie filed the pleadings himself.

The Chief Justice. -  I hope and trust that some regulations will be made to prevent this most improper practice.  It is high time it should be put a stop to, and that no persons but Attornies of the Court should be permitted to prepare pleadings.  Persons who do so ought to be subjected to heavy penalties.

The Attorney-General. - I have now gone through the affidavits in reply to Mr. Stephen's charges; that they are most perfectly and completely answered, I am satisfied.  I have met them fully and fairly, and I hope and believe that the Court will see, that I have in every way conducted myself bona-fide, I consider it unnecessary to offer any other remarks.

The Solicitor-General rose to reply.

The Chief Justice. - I have to request, Mr. Solicitor-General, that you will confine yourself to the mere dry matter before me; instead of which, in your former address, you went completely out of the case, and I confess I did not hear one word from you, which went to shew the grounds, or the authority on which you rested your motion; and perhaps I have been too precipitate in calling upon the Attorney-General to answer these affidavits.

The Solicitor-General. - I shall endeavour to confine myself to the dry point to which your Honor alludes.  If it is to resolve itself into any question of technicality, I know not how I can presume to offer to the Court any opinion as to what steps should be taken.  If the Court should think that the practice which I object to, is correct, of course I can have no objection.  I have done my duty; and I leave it with the Court, feeling as I do, how much it concerns the honour and purity of the Practitioners.  I confess I am really ignorant how I should now proceed.

The Chief Justice. - I know not what right a Counsel has to come to this Court, and ask how he is to proceed.

The Solicitor-General. - I have all along expressed my ignorance on this point.  I do not see that I could with propriety take any other steps; but if it be, as I say it is, most gross, most monstrous, in every degree, I say that though a hundred tongues should advocate it, yet that something must be done to put it down.  If it is decided that it is the custom of the Profession to proceed thus, of course the present proceedings will drop.  But, if it is, as I consider, it a most improper course, it cannot stop here - it must be put an end to.  Throughout this whole case, I have never imputed motives; but although I have not made any such imputations, yet I say that the practice is in every respect abominable.

The Chief Justice – But what is it that does all this.

The Solicitor-General. - I say the drawing pleadings on both sides.

The Chief Justice. - Yes; but what part of your affidavits is left unanswered by the Attorney-General.  How have you proved a contempt against the Attorney-General.  In some cases a reference is made to the Master, to report upon affidavits, -- but I very much doubt in this case whether I should refer it to Mr. Hone, because, after what is publicly sworn as to the Meeting, and the arrangements thereon, it would be more proper that the Court should do so itself, if it is considered necessary.  The Master is only vice the Court, who can act for itself at its own pleasure.  Contempts are all subject to the particular circumstances under which they exist; but after all, this case depends upon what really is the duty of a Counsel, who has received a retainer, and upon which point I have no information before me, but the affidavits of the Gentlemen of the Profession here, and to which I must refer; for I apprehend I can only entertain this as a contempt of Court.

The Solicitor-General. - I confess I am quite at a loss how I am to supply this information.  I have no means of doing so, in my opinion the practice is impure and improper to the last degree, and does away with the purity of the Profession.  I do not know a single case of this sort; and how I am to support my application, except upon principle and common sense, I know not.

The Chief Justice. - If you considered this a bad practice, a remedy was open to petition this Court, praying that it might be put an end to.  And if the Court had not the power to do so, there is another remedy by application to the Legislature.  But I certainly must treat this case, either as a contempt, or not at all.

The Attorney-General. - I hope the Court does not suppose that I have the smallest objection to its proceeding.  The fact is, that the application is not what it is pretended to be, as to the practice of this Court.  Its real meaning and intention is, to attack my character; that is the real object.

The Solicitor-General. - I suppose then, that if I cannot shew that this is a contempt, I can have nothing more to say.  I am not desirous of throwing any imputations upon motives, or attacking character; and I do not say more than the practice is bad, and ought to be put down.  I cannot prove this, I admit, but still I contend it is so, otherwise I must give up my understanding.

The Chief Justice. - Yes, but the understanding of one man, is one thing; and that of another, is another thing.  And I do complain that there is no authority shewn to me, by which to establish this.  I consider it the duty of Counsel, on bringing forward this application, to have been prepared to do so.

The Solicitor-General. - I am only complaining of improper practice.

The Chief Justice. - Improper is a large term!  It really ought to be shewn to me how this is a contempt, and what are the specific duties of Barristers towards their clients.

The Solicitor-General. - If it be necessary for me to prove that the practice is unjustifiable, I confess I cannot do so; and therefore I must move for further Enquiry, or Attachment.

The Chief Justice. - As to Attachment, that can only be to bring the party complained of before the Court; that cannot apply here, for the Attorney-General is already before the Court.  It seems to me, that every Gentlemen who practises here, being admitted by this Court, is under its jurisdiction.  Then the question is, what are the duties of a Barrister to his Client.  It would have been very desirable to have had some authority brought before me, as a general principle, shewing the general duty of a Barrister to his client.  Formerly the pleadings were viva voce.  The statements were taken down by the Officers of the Court, from the parties themselves.  The first statement was the declaration, and the reply was the plea.  In recent times, a body of Gentlemen has arisen in England, were business is limited to these duties.  After all, I take it the greatest difficulty in this question is, to ascertain what is the real duty of a Counsel to his client.

Mr. Hone. - As the practice of the Gentlemen here has been spoken of I think it right so state, that, in the case of Lord v. Rowcroft, I held a General Retainer for Mr. Lord; and when it was wished that I should act for Mr. Rowcroft, the opposite party were liberal enough to release me.

Mr. Cartwright. - I beg to remind Mr. Hone, that on an occasion relative to the taxation of costs, some particular fees were admitted by him, as to which some remarks were made; and which certainly proved clearly to my mind that the practice was not considered by Mr. Hone in any way objectionable.

Mr. Hone. - I have no doubt whatever, Mr. Cartwright, but that you are perfectly accurate.

Mr. Butler. - It is quite clear that the practice was never matter of doubt at home; I have known it constantly to occur.  I never knew an instance where it was questioned.

The Chief Justice. - At all events it ought to be considered what effect the practice has here.

Solicitor-General. - I have only to repeat, that I have been actuated solely by the sense which I feel of the impurity and gross impropriety of the practice.  I do not mean to impugn motives, but I am satisfied that something must be done to put an end to it; and I shall therefore humbly move, that the Attorney-General be struck off the Rolls of this Court.

His Honor the Chief Justice then ordered copies of the affidavits to be made for his perusal, and the Court adjourned to Friday.

Pedder C.J., 20 September 1825

His Honor the Chief Justice, on taking his seat this morning, said, that he had received a paper, purporting to be a Petition, from a Mr. Crowther, and desired to know if there was any one in Court who owned it.  Mr. Crowther, who was at the table, said, it was his, and the Judge then said, that his conduct had been very improper - that the matters mentioned in the paper were not the subject matters of Petitions, and that the paper, though styled a Petition, had not the form of one - that if the contents were made known to the persons whom it was meant to affect, it might produce serious consequences to the writer - that he knew the motives of this application, which were mo[s]t improper - that he should not give any reply to it, and wished particularly to state, that he never would do so with respect to any other of the same kind.

Attorney General. - ``They each receive about £50 a-year from the Crown."

Chief Justice - ``Look then, again, at retained household Advocates (if they may be so called), or at Institutions with standing Counsel.  Can these Counsel advise a party to bring an action against them?  Can I even draw a pleading, merely because A. B. has not come to give me a special retainer?  He might have known nothing about my being applied to - he might be ill, or unable to come.  I cannot say that I am clearly satisfied by these affidavits that it can be right.  The general understanding is shewn as to retainers by practice.  If, for instance, a rich man (and I have heard it has been done here) gave general retainers to every or almost any member of the profession, what is his object, but to let any poor man get assistance where he can, and thus all legal talent would be swept up by one man, and the whole community deprived of a benefit meant to be for all."

Attorney General. - ``I cannot at this period recollect it.  I might have put in a word or so - or I might not.  How can I recollect whether I did it or not?"

Chief Justice. - ``There is one fact set forth, not straight forwardly answered in this affidavit, which is material to shew how far, and to what extent, the Attorney General entered into the facts and history of Laurie's case, and that is as to the conversations with Child and Oldfield.  For there was no Attorney here; Laurie conversed with the Attorney-General respecting his case himself.  There is no admission by the Attorney General that it was the same cas[e], nor is any part of Laurie's statement answered, as to these conversations.  Then as to the conversations respecting the declaration.  The Attorney General says he never conversed upon it at Mr. Murray's, and that Laurie brought it to him, and he merely says he looked over it.  I do apprehend the matters of the affidavits should have been fully answered.  How are they answered here?  I must say, not in a proper straight forward way."

Attorney General. - ``I beg your Honor to recollect, that I stated in Court, that I never conversed as to the declaration at Mr. Murray's, or elsewhere, and I offered to supply the latter words in the affidavit.  I certainly believe I saw two persons with Mr. Laurie, but not more than once, and for a short time only."

Chief Justice. - ``Mr. Stephen's affidavit states, that he recorded a judgment by default, but that the Attorney General advised him to erase it, giving as a reason, that the defendant's pleading could not injure the plaintiff, as they had admitted most of the facts.  The Attorney General admits the advice, but denies that he gave any such reason for it.  Afterwards pleas were put in, one of which was very long and special, imputing felony to the plaintiff.  When the Attorney General swears he did not know what facts were admitted, surely he was mistaken, for they were certainly made in his presence, before myself at Launceston."

Attorney General. - ``I assure your Honor I remained only a short time - not ten minutes."

Chief Justice - ``Then it depends on this, were the facts then admitted.  The principal facts of seizure, &c. were admitted, as soon as they entered the room.  The Attorney General, in admitting that these pleas were drawn by him, says he was pressed by Mr. Dawes, and even entreated to do so.  This shews that he thought it was wrong, the suit being an adverse one, and the case materially depending on the frame of the pleadings.  The anxiety shewn by the Attorney General to avoid the imputation of drawing them readily, shews he was sensible of its dangerous tendency, and that his giving this assistance might look like betraying his client.  This is as much acting on both sides, as if he opened the case, and then [w]ent over and did the same for the defendant.  See the dilemma in which this places him, when he is some months afterwards directed by the Government to conduct the defendant's case.  The Attorney General doubts if he can do so, although he had already aided him by drawing his pleas, and he consults the Master, to know if he might with justice to Laurie obey.  Why did not those doubts operate equally strong, when Mr. Dawes applied to him? and why after all does he at last give his aid to the defendant?  but because he was the retained Advocate of the Crown, which called upon him.  But first, there was a demurrer to these pleas.  Mr. Stephen says, that after conversations on the subject wi[t]h the Attorney General, a demurrer was determined on, and put in.  The Attorney General admits that he assented to the demurrer, but he denies that he ever had any consultation on the subject, or had the pleas shewn to him.  Now, I am bound to say, that the Attorney General's mode of answering this matter (which is positively sworn to by Mr. Stephen), is not a straight forward one.  And how did he assent?  He did so necessarily as Counsel in the case.  It strikes me that this is not properly explained.  He admits the assent, but he denies the consultation.  I do not think this part is answered in a downright satisfactory manner."

[We have not room for the remainder of this important case, and must defer it till our next.  The result (after a desultory discussion, in the course of which the Attorney General ``regretted that his Honor had taken an erroneous view of his conduct, and declared his perfect readiness [t]o go most fully into all the facts") is, an order by the Court, that the Attorney General be examined upon interrogatories, [t]ouching certain facts of the case not dis[t]inctly apparent.]

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In the Supreme Court, on Tuesday last, while every ear was listening with deep [a]ttention to the opinion of the Judge, on Mr. Stephen's motion, a tremendous voice [r]oared out, `Justice!  Justice!' when a [g]hastly countenance looking up, asked, `where? where?'  `In Van Diemen's Land', re-echoed the voice, `for you, cor[ru]pt Radicial.'

Pedder C.J., 20 September 1825

Source: Hobart Town Gazette, 1 October 1825

(Continued from our last Report.)

His Honor the Chief Justice proceeded to point out the course adopted upon motions of this kind, and declared his opinion that upon this part of the case, the Attorney General not having replied distinctly and pointedly to the matters charged, should be compelled to answer upon interrogatories to be exhibited to him respecting the conversation with Laurie, Oldfield, and Child; and as to his conversation or consultation with the Solicitor General, as to the pleas and the demurer put in to them.

His Honor continued. - ``The next case in the affidavits, is that of Symons v. Atkinson.  It appears, that at a particular date, the Attorney General receives a general retainer from Mr. Atkinson.  Now as to the question arising on the extent of the claim which a general retainer gives a client upon the advice, I would only repeat what I have said before, as to the instance of King's Counsel.  I should, however, like to know distinctly, if it could be ascertained, how far the retainer in this Gentleman's behalf actually went.  The Attorney General's statement is, that after having the retainer, he was applied to by Symons for his opinion respecting a lease granted to Walford; and that upon this, he subsequently drew a declaration for Symons, against Mr. Atkinson, and accepted a special retaining fee conditionally in the case - that is, subject to the right of Mr. Atkinson, under his general retainer.  But even here, if I am right as to the effect of a general retainer, a Counsel could not consistently have drawn such a pleading.  Was this done conditionally?  Let the case be looked at in the light in which a client himself would be apt to consider it.  A, gives me a general retaining fee.  Now, the effect of this is said to be merely to secure my services, by the right of afterwards compelling the acceptance of a special retainer.  But if I, before giving him notice, advise against his interests, or frame a pleading against him, how can I have done my duty towards him under the general retainer?  I should thus previously have given my services to his adversary.  If this be allowable, and if it be admitted, as it is by the Attorney General himself, that it opens an opportunity for a dishonest Advocate to injure or ruin one client or the other, how can the practice be a proper one?  Before the client has any notice, there is his Counsel's advocacy against him previously drawn, and put on the files of the Court.  The client expects to have all my assistance, and the benefit of all my counsel and talent.  But how can I give it him, if I have previously assisted his adversary?

Upon the whole, I do think, that upon the points I have mentioned, and in the case of Pitcairn v. Lord, further information ought to be before the Court, and therefore I must direct the Attorney General to answer to interrogatories.

[In our former report, it appears in one sentence, that Mr. Butler spoke of the practice of one Attorney appearing for both parties, being a usual practice.  The context, however, will shew, that Gentleman's statement, related to drawing pleadings only, on both sides, and not to appearances.

Pedder C.J., 26 September 1825

Source: Colonial Times, 30 September 1825

The Solicitor-General stated, that the interrogatories which he had filed, to be exhibited to the Attorney-General, having been considered by the Court as improper and unfit to be put, he now applied to be permitted to amend them.

His Honor the Chief Justice refused the application.  He stated that the proceedings, being altogether inquisitorial, although in constant practice, it was quite necessary that they should not be allowed to hang over the head of the ac[cu]sed; that it was the duty of the party moving such a proceeding to take care that it was correct; and not to lie by until the time when the examination ought to have taken place, after having exhibited interrogatories, certainly not only improper to be answered, but improper to be put.

Pedder C.J., 30 September, 3 October 1825

Source: Colonial Times, 7 October 1825

Friday, Sept. 30.

The Attorney-General stated, that he was very desirous of then shewing cause against the Rule obtained by the Solicitor-General, that the interrogatories should be amended and settled by the Court.

The Chief-Justice expressed his regret that as authorities were not produced by the Solicitor-General in support of his first application on this subject, that he had not hesitated in complying with it.  He thought it best however that cause should be shewn in the usual manner.

Monday, Oct. 3.

The Solicitor-General here interrupted the Learned Gentleman by appealing to the Court against the tendency of his observations, which the Solicitor-General stated had nothing to do with the Rule.

The Chief Justice - The Attorney-General has only warned me against allowing my mind to be prejudiced by what I may hear elsewhere not upon oath, and I apprehend he has a great right to do so.

The Attorney-General continued by repeating his former observations.  He stated that if this Rule was granted and fresh interrogatories exhibited, weeks may pass over, and witnesses may be collected from God knows where, to make statements not upon oath, which may be calculated to leave the most dangerous impressions, and the recollection of which the most conscientious man existing might not be able wholly to throw from his mind. - The Attorney-General continued to argue upon this point at some length, and concluded his address in the following words, which he delivered in a tone of animation and feeling impossible to be described: -- I am only anxious, said the Learned Gentleman, to guard the Court against the possibility that even the breath of suspicion may attach to the accuracy of its proceeding, to guard the administration of Justice in this Court against the possibility of its perfect purity being ever called into question; and above all, I am most anxious to protect the Court from the foul stain which the Solicitor-General is endeavouring, and has endeavoured, to throw upon its rectitude!

The Solicitor-General. - I am ready to acknowledge the necessity of immediate decision; but I complain that the Attorney-General has imputed to me motives of endeavouring to injure him by this proceeding.

The Chief Justice. - What else is it but a criminal charge against him?

The Solicitor-General. - I stated originally my entire ignorance how to proceed; that I knew not how to go on.  But after what has passed, I would not for a moment press my application.  It has not been my fault.

The Chief Justice. --  Whose fault then has it been?  The Attorney-General could not exhibit interrogatories against himself.

The Attorney-General here quoted instances of very extraordinary acts on the part of Attornies who had been guilty even of gross frauds, and which, if the parties concerned did not complain of, the Court did not itself visit.

The Chief Justice. - I shall be very short in my remarks on this application.  This whole proceeding has been brought forward without any authority being adduced from any text book to sanction such.  If the Court was to do what the Solicitor-General now requires, it would render itself the prosecutor - it would be making the interrogatories its own.  There is nothing which can justify the forcing a man to answer interrogatories against himself, but to accelerate the proceedings, to get off the Enquiry as rapidly as possible.  The Solicitor-General says he does not know how to proceed.  It is not my duty to tell him; he comes forward and makes a very serious charge, and my only fear is, that I have been a little too precipitate.  I think it was not my duty to point out wherein the Attorney-General's affidavit was insufficient.  This proceeding being one perfectly inquisitorial, it appears to me, that in the absence of any authorities whatever to justify this application, that I am bound to refuse it, and to discharge the Rule.  I shall give my opinion upon the other parts of the subject on Wednesday.

The Attorney-General. - I humbly submit to your Honor, that it is of vital importance to me to receive your decision as soon as possible.  But I shall have no objection upon the understanding that the private Enquiry, now going on, shall be in the mean time suspended.

The Chief Justice. - As you have mentioned that Enquiry, and I cannot but admit that you have a great right to do so, I can only say, that it is out of my power to give any pledge upon the subject.  A long and desultory conversation then ensued, in the course of which His Honor mentioned the circumstance of a Barrister (we believe His Honor alluded to Mr. Clifford), who at the time of the O. P. riot, went to the Theatre in his full costume, and in a state in which no Gentleman ought to appear in public, and that His Honor never heard of even such conduct having been followed up by any proceedings such as the present.

Pedder C.J., 5 October 1825

Civil Side, October 5, 1825.

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This being the morning fixed to decide the question of unexampled interest, which has lately occupied so much of the public attention, His Honor the Chief Justice delivered his opinion, in a speech which lasted upwards of three hours, the leading features of which were, as nearly as we could collect, as follows:--

``It now becomes my duty, to give judgment upon the motion made to the Court, respecting certain conduct of the Attorney General.  The subject is one so extremely important, and considering the authorities adduced, respecting the practice at home, one attended with so many peculiar difficulties, that I should have wished a longer time had been allowed me for its consideration, were it not unjust and unfair, that a criminal proceeding of this kind should be permitted to remain undisposed of, and the Attorney General thereby kept in suspence respecting it, for one moment longer than is absolutely necessary.  This motion is founded on three affidavits, -- Mr. Laurie, Mr. Stephen, and Mr. Dawes, all representing certain alleged improprieties of practice of the Attorney General, to which that Gentleman has been called upon to answer.  The affidavit of the A[t]torney General being, however, in some respects insufficient, the Court directed that he should be examined on interrogatories respecting them.  To these interrogatories, or to certain parts of them, the Attorney General objected, or demurred, on the ground that they extended to other matters which he was not bound to answer; and I, having concurred with him, the whole were suppressed accordingly.  A motion was afterwards made to the Court , to amend them; but that motion I felt bound to refuse, and I am still convinced I could not have done otherwise.  Were the Court to allow the amendments of errors found in interrogatories, and to take on itself the task of settling them, would it not make itself thereby improperly assisting, or become actually a party, to the prosecution?  There is neither precedent nor principle laid down, by which so strange an application would be justified.  Dismissing, therefore, from my mind, this part of the subject, the next question is, what can I, or am I, bound to do with the original motion, upon the case simply as disclosed here, without further explanation or information before me?  One extraordinary circumstance in this case is, that the persons actually injured (if it all) by the acts complained of, if any such there be, do not come forward as the prosecutors.  Are then Mr. Stephen and Mr. Dawes instructed to represent their grievance?  If any injury has been done one or the other of the parties alluded to in these affidavits, why does he not come forward to complain?  And if he do not, am I bound to entertain the complaint of another made for him, whereas in this case, no one is sworn to as authorised by him?  This is, however, an objection that does not apply to Laurie's case, and consequently his is one of which I am bound to take notice.  He is the party interested in the question, and we have his complaint brought before the Court.  I certainly have therefore strong dou[bt]s, whether it was proper for the Court to have noticed any other of these complaints; and consequently, in passing my judgment this day, I thrown entirely out of consideration, every other case but that alone, and I shall dismiss the others without further notice.  I wish here to observe, that when here last, I was publicly reminded (I beg to be understood that I do not complain of having been so), but I was publicly desired not to be influenced in my judgment, by any knowledge of circumstances acquired elsewhere.  I hope, however, that I am not forgetful of my duty in this respect.  But in order to prevent the possibility of a suspicion, that I can have formed my opinion, or been influenced in it, by information on the case, from any other sources than the affidavits themselves, I will carefully read every one of them through in open Court, so that if any single circumstance commented on, or alluded to by me, be not derived from these affidavits, and from them alone, the fact will be apparent to every one who is present, and I shall be glad to have it pointed out to me.  (All the affidavits put in in this case were then read by His Honor, and from time to time commented on.)  I have now read over the whole affidavits, and shewn distinctly the charge which the Attorney General is, upon the face of them, called upon to answer.  I have already observed, that with such parts of these charges as relate to persons who (though the parties really affected) do not come forward to support them, I consider the Court to have nothing to do, and I therefore throw those parts of the affidavits absolutely and entirely out of my consideration, confining myself to the case of Laurie alone, who is the only interested party, as a complainanr, before the Court.  And with respect to this, the sole question for my judicial determination is, whether or not such a wrong or injury has been inflicted by the Attorney General, or such a degree of mal practice (if any) has been committed by him, as I am bound to punish.  With considerations of propriety or delicacy, upon which persons of different habits possess perhaps different opinions, I have nothing to do.  It is alleged, in some of the affidavits put on the fi[l]e by the Attorney General, that as to the propriety of the practice of framing pleadings on both sides, generally speaking, some opinion has been formerly expressed, or rule laid down by the Master.  The affidavits, however, state the fact from recollection and belief only.  No precise terms are stated to the Court, and it is possible that some words, meant to qualify or restrain the alleged opinion, were made use of which have been forgotten.  It would have been much more satisfactory, therefore, that the Master's own affidavit on this point had been procured and laid before me, because any opinion founded on the long experience of Mr. Hone, would of course be entitled to every consideration; although that opinion would not embrace or materially affect the case, as it relates to Laurie v. Griffiths, the circumstances of which are materially different from those of any to which Mr. Hone's alledged opinion would have applied, or indeed any one of the affidavits, as to the rule respecting general retainers and the drawings of pleadings in ordinary cases.  For I do not find it stated in any of these, that pleadings are ever drawn in this way after accepting a retainer, and it would make a material difference whether that retainer were general or special in the cause.  Now how does this case of Laurie v. Griffiths stand?  It is sworn by Laurie that he laid a case before the Attorney General, on which he wrote his opinion, advising an action to be brought, laying the damages at £2000.  The Attorney General's answer speaks also of a case, but does not express definitively what that case was.  That was one point not satisfactorily and directly answered.  It was possible that it might be some case up[o]n another subject.  Consequently I cannot take it upon these affidavits that he advised the action.  It is clear, however, tha[t] he accepted a special retaining fee - that he perused and signed the declaration, and that afterwards he draws the pleas, imputing to Laurie the commission of felony.  Next comes the statement as to the demurrer put in to them by the plaintiff.  Mr. Stephen swears that he consulted the Attorney General respecting it, and that the demurrer was then determined upon.  The Attorney General answers by denying having been so consulted by Mr. Stephen, but he says he merely assented to the line of conduct which Mr. Stephen intended to pursue.  Now this answer is a mere attempt to colour the fact and evade the charge.  For how he can say that he merely assented to the proposition of a junior Counsel, and distinguish that act from a consultation as advocate, is to me quite unaccountable.  I must say he assented as Counsel for Laurie, for if not how otherwise could he have assented?  Was not this advising the demurrer?  He received a retainer, looked over the declaration as Laurie's advocate, advised the judgment by default to be withdrawn, and afterwards on Mr. Dawes' entreaty drew the special pleas for Griffiths.  I take for granted that he advised the judgment to be withdrawn, simply because he thought it unprofessional.  The question then here is could he have acted thus with propriety?  Was it, in short, right or wrong?  This being the question, one is naturally anxious to find out what are the duties of Counsel."  His Honor then, with considerable pains, recapitulated the nature of both at some length, and proceeded to notice two cases - that of Lords Cholmondely and Clinton, relating to the case of a Solicitor being restrained from acting for one party in consequence of having been formerly a clerk in the office of the Solicitor for the other party, and a case reported in a newspaper respecting a complaint made in England against Mr. Montagu for having accepted a brief for the bankrupt, when he had previously been retained by the petitioning creditor, and had attended several meetings on his behalf.  His Honor commented on these very minutely, and remarked that although, after the most attentive consideration, he had neither seen nor heard any thing to alter his opinion with respect to the practice in itself, either upon principle or as respecting mischiefs and dangers which attended it, yet he could not distinguish the case of Mr. Montagu very materially from the present; and if Lord Chancellor Eldon admitted such practice as that complained of there to be correct, it would be impossible for him, for one moment, to contemplate a different decision here.  For, if the advising of parties and the drawing of pleadings be acts of advocacy, so are the acts of appearing and arguing for a bankrupt, and for a petitioning creditor; and if the latter were not thought improper, it seems difficult to say that the former is to be held so. - Here (said His Honor) is a Gentleman attending twelve times for a creditor, and then without notice accepting a brief from the bankrupt.  It appears, however, that notice was in this instance unnecessary, as it was known that the creditor did not in fact intend to employ Mr. Montagu in the case; and I do not know that this newspaper report may be quite accurate.  There may have been other circumstances materially affecting the case, nor does it appear what was the object of the brief given to Mr. Montagu in the bankrupt's behalf.  Still, it could scarcely have been a friendly one - and yet the Lord Chancellor admits that there was nothing improper in it.  On the other hand, in this case of Laurie, if notice had been given to him that the Attorney General was applied to to draw pleas against him, especially where their nature and the necessity of framing them were so vitally important, could it be supposed that Laurie would have consented to his doing so?  What would be my own conduct in such a case, there can be no doubt of.  I know if it ever should be my misfortune to be involved in a suit at law, I would not for one moment think of employing any man who would draw pleadings on both sides in it - one day for me and the next against me.  What is the use or the object of a special retainer?  Is it then only to give me a right to buy off your Counsel from drawing pleadings against you, when he is subsequently applied to by your adversary to frame them?  Upon the whole, however, inasmuch as the drawing of pleadings is nothing more than an act of advocacy, and as the acts of advocacy may, as appears by the cases quoted to me, be without impropriety (at least in a legal point of view) drawn for both parties by the same Counsel, I find it impossible to say that the conduct of the Attorney General, in Laurie's case, amounts to a wrong which I am called upon or have power to punish.  At the same time I cannot but say that I am sorry to find that I have not the power.  I should have been glad to find that it was a wrong of that nature that I could punish.  I see nothing but mischiefs which must result from such practices.  The dangerous power which the mere drawing of pleadings on both sides places in the hands of a bad man, is quite appalling.  It  might lead to opportunities of committing the most base and dishonourable treachery towards one or both.  If I were to give vent to my own feelings on the subject, I should scarcely find words strong enough to reprobate it in - and I regret that I have not the power to punish it as a case of wrong cognizable by the Court."

Attorney General. - ``I admit the practice to be as your Honor describes it.  I have stated, all the way through, that it is a bad practice.  I have only defended the motives upon which I have acted."

Chief Justice. - ``The conclusion to which I have arrived is, that I do not think any wrong has been committed, which this Court has the power to punish.  It is however a painful conclusion; because, I think, the practice a most mean - wretched - I should say, detestable practice.  I cannot trust myself, when looking at it, as it would affect the mind of a man of honour, to express all that I feel upon the occasion.  I have here, however, nothing to do with considerations of honour - of propriety - or of delicacy.  The Court has only to regard the case as one of legal right or wrong; and I have decided it on these grounds alone.  It is not a wrong which the Court has the power to punish; and consequently, the motion must be dismissed.  It has, however, been in some local courts, the Palace Court for instance, where there are few practisers, thought necessary to lay down the rules to meet cases of this kind.  Is it not so in the Palace Court?"

The Master. - ``It is so - and I think there really should be rules in this Court also."

Chief Justice. - ``I desire again to be understood, as deciding this case upon strict rules of right and wrong alone; with which my own private opinion, or mere questions of delicacy and propriety, has nothing to do."

Chief Justice. - ``The Court has a jurisdiction in such a case as this.  When the Court admits a Gentleman to practise as a Barrister, that Gentleman undertakes to do the duty of his clients.  It is by an act of the Court itself, that persons are put in a situation to do wrong.  What are the duties of a Barrister to his client?  I do not expect to find authority for each particular act that may occur.  Having shown that duty, it was incumbent on the party moving, to show that that duty was infringed.  The question of contempt may be taken into consideration, in which the wilfulness with which the act is done, must be taken into account."

The Hobart Town Gazette of 17 September 1825 noted that this was the first time the court had sat in the new court house.  Before then, it had sat in a room called Bostock's Store while repairs were being done at the court house: Hobart Town Gazette, 2 July 1825.