[legal practitioner, admission to practice – Stephen, Sydney, admission to practice]

In re Stephen

Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land

Montagu J., 21 October 1839

Source: Hobart Town Advertiser, 25 October 1839[1]

            On his Honor taking his seat, he addressed Mr. Sydney Stephen, who appeared at the table, and remarked that he (Mr.S.) was not upon the rolls of the Court.

            Mr. Stephen replied that he had been admitted eleven years ago.

            His Honor observed that the Act under which Mr.S. had been admitted, had expired; but under the new Act he would be admitted upon taking the oath.

            Mr. Stephen considered the Court was still the same, and that the statute of limitation could not apply to him, he having been without the jurisdiction of the Court.

            His Honor did not know of anything which would prevent the admission of Mr. Stephen at any moment, but the point alluded to not having been argued when the new rules were made, his Honor thought it was now too late at the 99th hour to enter into it.

            Mr. Stephen did not desire to argue the point, but he had observed by the public papers that the rules of the Court had been relaxed in the case of Mr. Browne’s admission.  The learned gentleman could not say whether that case were correctly reported.

            His Honor admitted the relaxation in the case in question, but Mr. Stephen’s case did not appear analogous.  He was afraid that he should find a difficulty in admitting Mr. Stephen himself.  The Charter empowered “the Court” to admit; but he was not the Court.  In another section the Court was empowered to make rules.  The first rule is that if parties admitted under the old rules, applied within the first term after the passing of the new rules, they would be re-admitted upon taking the oath.

            Mr. Stephen considered that the terms of the rule should be constructed liberally, and that the “first term” should be constructed to mean the “first term within which the party could have applied.”  In this instance, the present term was such a term.

            His honor could not place such a construction upon the rule, which would be contrary to the intent and spirit of the Act.  He had no objection, however, to do away with the rule requiring notice.  This he had power to do; and the Judges had also power to admit in vacation; therefore, as the Chief Justice would be in Chambers between 3 and 4 o’clock, Mr. Stephen could then be admitted if that would suit his convenience.

            Mr. Stephen would avail himself of the opportunity.  He had prepared a plea in the case of Cobb and Molyneux, as they had notwithstanding all he could say, positively determined not to plead to any new indictment.

            His Honor would postpone the case until after the admission of Mr. Stephen.

Notes