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[stealing, cattle - jury, address to - convict,
evidence by]
R.
v. Humphreys
Supreme Court of New South Wales
Willis J., 2 November 1840
Source: Sydney
Herald, 3 November 1840[1]
William Humphreys was indicted for stealing a Bullock, the property of Benjamin
Cougan, of Campbell Town.
Before putting the case
to the jury, his Honor addressed them as follows:
Gentlemen of the Jury –
In compliance with the practice that I have hitherto adopted, I
venture to trouble you on our first meeting with a few general observations.
We are once more assembled to investigate and punish the commission
of crime. Of crime, I say, as distinguished from sin,
for every crime must be a positive breach or wilful disregard of
some existing public law – though many offences against earthly
authority are not otherwise sinful in the eye of Heaven, than as
infractions of that implied contract of obedience to the Legislature
to which every member of society is subject. On the other hand
there are many species which, in a legal sense, cannot be criminal,
because in their nature they are not obvious to human accusation.
But it must not, therefore, be supposed that the law is careless
of religion. Wisely, indeed, has religion been established as useful
and necessary to society; and it is so wrought into the very frame
of government, as to become essential to its existence. Wherefore,
though the well being of the state is the peculiar object of the
magistrate, yet it is inseparable from a due concern for religion.
This, however, is perfectly consistent with liberty of conscience,
and the free use of reason and enquiry. Nor does it in any wise
authorise persecution. Freedom of thought is the prerogative of
the human race; a quality inherent in the very nature of a thinking
being; a privilege which can neither be denied to him; nor taken
from him. But freedom of opinion may be enjoyed without descending
to religious controversy. “When I view,” (says Bishop Home) “the
innumerable unhappy differences among Christians, all of whom are
equally oppressed with the cares and calamities of life, I call
to mind those beautiful and affecting words which Milton represents
Adam as addressing to Eve, after they had wearied themselves with
mutual accusation—
“But rise, let us no more
contend, nor blame
Each other, blamed enough elsewhere, but
strive
In offices of love, how we may lighten
Each other’s burden in our share of woe.”
Among all classes and denominations, offences must
come, which it is the province of the law to punish, and by punishment
to endeavour to suppress. The prosecuting of crime in this colony
is confided to the Attorney-General, who exercises precisely the
same functions here, in this respect, as the Lord Advocate in Scotland.
“He has not only the right of prosecuting all sorts of crimes without
distinction, after due enquiry into the fact, but also the right
to determine the justice and expediency of bringing the party accused
to trial at all; a right which in England and Ireland is entrusted
to a Grand Jury. In theory, perhaps,” says the learned writer
on the Criminal Law of Scotland from whom I quote, “entrusting to
a Jury the right of determining whether the party accused shall
be put upon his trial, may appear more favorable than confiding
it to a single person, and that person an officer of the Crown.
It is believed, however,” (adds this author) “that no example has
occurred since the Revolution, where it can with truth be said that
this right has been abused by an oppressive or groundless prosecution
at the instance of this officer.”
During the three years
I have now sat on this Bench, I can bear the same testimony, so
far as my observation has extended, with regard to the Attorney-General
of New South Wales; and I do so the more readily as he is now about
to leave us. May his voyage be prosperous, and the fondest wishes
he may have formed on revisiting his native land be amply realized!
His departure will not affect any pending prosecution, for it is
not a particular person as Attorney-General that the law
looks to as prosecutor, but an officer under that name, who prosecutes
for the interest of the public. Having said thus much respecting
prosecutions, permit me to say a few words with regard to the evidence
by which for the most part they are, here, almost of necessity,
supported. By the law of, England where a man has been guilty of
treason, felony, or any species of the crimen falsi, as perjury,
forgery, and the like, his testimony is not receivable on the ground
of the infamy of character which the commission of such crimes indicates.
(See Roscoe’s Criminal Evidence, p. 100.) It was however held some
years ago, by the then majority of the Court, that such evidence
was admissible in this colony, without any express law for that
purpose, on the sole ground, as I understand, of expediency;
and to that decision I am compelled to submit. I mention it to
show what has been done even against the positive rule of English
law, merely because it was deemed expedient. It is on this
ground, and this alone, that the testimony of the witness Arthur
was this day admitted. Much excitement, it seems, has recently
been created by an Act of the local legislature, very similar to
that of the 9th Geo. IV. No. 4, for ascertaining the number,
names, and condition of the inhabitants of this colony; and
no one regrets more truly than I do that any such feeling should
have arisen, or even for a moment have existed. It seems to me,
however, to have originated in a misconception of the law of evidence,
an error which even lawyers may have fallen into, but which I think
a few words will make appear to be palpable. It depends then upon
this, namely, whether a witness is bound to answer questions tending
to degrade him? “The point,” says Mr. Roscoe, in his work on Criminal
Evidence, p. 133, citing 1st Phillips on Evidence, p. 265, “has
frequently been raised and argued, whether a witness, whose credit
is sought to be impeached on cross-examination, is bound to give
an answer to questions put to him with that view. The doubt only
exists where the questions put to him are not relevant to the
matter in issue, but are merely propounded for the purpose of
throwing light on the witness’ character; for if the transactions
to which the witness is interrogated form any part of the issue,
he will be obliged to give evidence, however strongly it may
reflect upon his character.” Such is the law as laid down by
two eminent text writers on this subject. It is true that where
the questions are not relevant to the matter in issue, there
are authorities (authorities on which I have hitherto acted, and
still intend to act) which say, that although the question may be
asked, the witness is not bound to answer; but, even
on this point, there have been conflicting decisions (see Roscoe’s
Criminal Evidence, p. 133 and 135.) I, therefore, deem it a mistake
to suppose that any pertinent questions or numerical returns, authorised
by the legislature, such for instance, as those under the English
Income Tax Act, when it prevailed, can properly be considered as
illegal. The principle on which Courts of Justice protect witnesses
in such cases is, according to a modern writer on Evidence in Equity
(Gresley p. 67) “to maintain decency and dignity in their own proceedings;”
that on which the legislature proceeds, I apprehend, is disregard
of the indelicacy for the sake of promoting that which in its wisdom
it conceives to be a greater advantage. In the present case, if
ether of the witnesses had been asked any question material and
relevant to the issue, acting on the principle I have stated, I
should have enforced their answer, however it might have tended
to disgrace them. I sincerely trust that I may have succeeded in
removing any misapprehension, and I would hope also, in allaying
any irritation that may have subsisted. There will probably be
many instances in the cases which you gentlemen, will have to try,
in which what I have said may be applicable; but I will proceed
with the evidence in the case which the public prosecutor has now
brought before you, merely adding, in the spirit of that religion
which I have already noticed as essential to all good government,
my fervent prayer that we may all live in peace, and that there
may be no divisions amongst us.
His Honor then proceeded
to his summing up of the case before the court, and left it to the
jury, who after a short consultation returned a verdict of Not Guilty.
Notes
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