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Decisions of the Superior Courts of New South Wales, 1788-1899

Published by the Division of Law     Macquarie University

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[stealing from dwelling house - Irish people, bias against - slang]

R. v. Wafer

Supreme Court of New South Wales

Kinchela J., 10 May 1836

Source: Sydney Herald, 12 May 1836[1]

 

John Wafer stood indicted for feloniously entering the dwelling-house of John O'Donnell, situate in Sussex-street, on the 19th of April, and stealing therefrom a yellow pocket piece and about five shillings in silver and copper.

John O'Donnell examined. - About two o'clock on the morning of the 19th April, I was alarmed by hearing a noise in my bed-room, my house keeper, who slept near me, said there was a man in the room - I got out of bed and with the assistance of a lodger secured the prisoner; he made his entry, at the back part by breaking through near the fire place with a jemmy, which was found there next morning. - During the examination of this witness a great deal of merriment was produced, from the manner in which he gave his testimony, his national blunders, and the attachment he professed to his house-keeper - whose attachment to him he never once doubted.

John Carey, a constable, proved to the prisoner being given in charge to him by the last witness, about two o'clock on the morning of the robbery; that he said it was a settler with him, that he was sure to be lagged; he also produced a crowbar, or jemmy, a yellow pocket piece and five shillings and three pence, together with a last hook, found on the prisoner.

The prisoner in his defence said that he was induced to go the house that night by the company the whole of the day.  Guilty, remanded.[2]

 

Notes

[1] See also Sydney Gazette, 12 May 1836.

[2] He was sentenced to death recorded: Sydney Herald, 23 May 1836.  Death recorded meant a formal sentence of death, without an intention that the sentence would be carried out.  Under (1823) 4 Geo. IV c. 48, s. 1, except in cases of murder, the judge had considerable discretion where an offender was convicted of a felony punishable by death.  If the judge thought that the circumstances made the offender fit for the exercise of Royal mercy, then instead of sentencing the offender to death, he could order that judgment of death be recorded.  The effect was the same as if judgment of death had been ordered, and the offender reprieved (s. 2).