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Decisions of the Superior Courts of New South Wales, 1788-1899

Ex parte Wentworth, in re Mansfield (1828) NSW Sel Cas (Dowling) 786; [1829] NSWSupC 63

criminal informations - criminal procedure - Darling, Governor, move to impeach - Grand Jury - criminal libel - Sudds and Thompson case


Supreme Court of New South Wales

Forbes C.J., Stephen and Dowling JJ, 30 September 1829

Source: Australian, 2 October 1829

Doctor Wardell moved for a rule to shew cause why a criminal information should not be filed against Ralph Mansfied, Editor and Publisher of the Sydney Gazette, for an imputed libel contained in a certain number of that Organ of the Government, published on the 7th of July last, as affecting the character of W. C. Wentworth, Esquire, Barrister at law.[1 ]  The learned Counsel grounded his motion upon an affidavit by Mr. Wentworth, which went unequivocally and clearly to falsify the libellous allegations contained in the aforesaid Gazette, and which formed part of what purported to be an answer by his Excellency the Governor, and which actually bore the signature Ralph Darling to a certain address signed by 116 persons out of the entire population of the Colony.  The words on which it was now sought to move for a rule nisi, the learned Council stated, on affidavit, were to be found in the aforesaid answer, especially in the following paragraph:--

``As to the `Impeachment' -- a gross and absurd compound of base and incredible calumnies -- it carries with it its own antidote, and furnishes ample means of judging of the character and motives of the author.'

These expressions, the learned Counsel contended, were confirmed by others of a similarly libellous character, which followed them; as:--

``If, gentlemen, there is any one part of your Address more gratifying to me than another, it is that wherein you `deny that the political opinions promulgated by the Opposition Journals, are those of the more intelligent classes of the community.'  These Journals have laboured incessantly to propagale [sic] a belief, that they are the voice of the public -- well knowing that they are not countenanced by any way of character or common respectability."

And several expressions used with reference to the foregoing, by the Editor of the Gazette aforesaid, the learned Counsel also contended, on affidavit, were so many aggravations of the imputed libellous matter.  Such as, ``the people have long witnessed the attacks of an incendiary press;" and again, ``they have witnessed these vile proceedings" with reference to the deponent, and the said Impeachment against the respondent to the said Address; which Impeachment deponent declared to be framed with a strict attention to facts and to truth.  To exemplify how highly injurious the expressions used would be to the promovent, the learned Counsel would ask, admitting the allegations to be true -- how could the man capable of compounding gross and infamous falsehoods, shew his face -- how support a station in the society of honest men?  Then how much more direct and poignant was the injury, when deponent (Mr. Wentworth) declared the libellous allegations used in the defendant's Paper, the Sydney Gazette, to be made without any regard to fact or to truth?  Finally, the learned Counsel contended, that he had shewn enough to conclude any doubts as to who was meant (in the allusion made to the Impeachment) as quoted above, and left it to the Court to say if the rule nisi which he then applied for should or should not be granted.

The Judges decided at this stage of the proceedings, that on a supplementary affidavit, by a disinterested person who considered the above aspersions as thrown out against Mr. Wentworth, being filed, they would feel bound to grant the rule.


Forbes C.J., Stephen and Dowling JJ, 30 September 1829

Source: Dowling, Select Cases, Vol. 2, Archives Office of N.S.W., 2/3462

[pp 240-241] [A criminal information moved for and granted on the last day of term per two Judges.  Dowling J dissentient.  Where a motion for a criminal Information for a libel the matter does not distinctly point to the applicant.  Held that a supplemental affidavit made by some other person than the applicant is necessary to shew that in his understanding it relates to the individual supposed to be Libelled.]

[p. 240]Sept 30th 1829

Exparte W C Wentworth In re Re Mansfield

Dr. Wardell moved for a rule nisi for a criminal Information against the Revd R. Mansfield for a libel on Mr. Wentworth in the Sydney Gazette of the 7th July last.  This being the last day of term.

Dowling J. enquired whether such a motion could be made on the last day of term?

It was at variance with the practice of the King's Bench at home.

Dr. Wardell said he knew of no such practice in this Court  He believed there were precedents for such applications on the last day of term.

S Stephen mentioned an instance of this kind in the case of Exparte Norton  In re Hayes on the 31st March last, where the Court granted a rule nisi for an information on the last day of term.

Forbes CJ. & Stephen J. inclined to hear the motion on the authority of the [p. 341] precedent cited but hoped that the instance would not be afterwards considered as an authority.

Dowling J.  It is my misfortune to differ from my learned Bretheren in this instance.  I object in principle and on general grounds of justice, as well as upon the authority of the practice of the Courts of the Mother Country to the entertaining of an application for a criminal Informations upon an exparte statement, having over his head perhaps for an indefinite time.  In the meantime he may sustain great prejudice and injury although in his power to show grounds for discharging the rule.  The precedent cited I consider a vicious one, and must have been established by surprize on the Court.  I enter my protest on principle against this mode of proceeding, but as my learned Bretheren are of opinion that the motion should be heard, I must submit to their better judgment.

The motion was then heard.  It was founded on the single affidavit of Mr. Wentworth who deposed that the alleged libellous matter alluded to him, though his name was [p. 242] not mentioned and the observations per se being of equivocal import.

The Court thought that there ought at least to be a supplemental affidavit of some other person than the party aggrieved, shewing that in his understanding the matter was published of and concerning the relation.

An affidavit being afterwards produced a rule nisi was granted.


Forbes C.J., Stephen and Dowling JJ, 19 December 1829

Source: Sydney Gazette, 22 December 1829[2 ]


(In Banco)


The King at the prosecution of W. C. Wentworth, Esq. v. the Rev. R. Mansfield. 

In this case, Dr. Wardell rose to move that the rule nisi, for leave to file a criminal information against the defendant, obtained last term, be made absolute. 

Mr. Norton appeared to shew cause against the motion, and addressed the Court to the following effect: -- May it please your Honors, in support of this application, which I observe alleges the matter complained of to be contained in very few words, Mr. Wentworth has filed a volumnous [sic] affidavit, which was no doubt intended to affect the defendant, with the knowledge of a variety of circumstances detailed therein, and consequently to imply malice in the publication which is the subject of the present proceeding.  The affidavit states, that the defendant did, in the Sydney Gazette of the 7th of July last, publish the following paragraph: -- ``As to the impeachment -- a gross and absurd compound of base and incredible calumnies -- it carries with it its own antidote, and furnishes ample means of judging of the character and motives of its author." -- This, your Honors will perceive, is the alleged libel which is sought to be made the subject of the present prosecution; and as Mr. Wentworth states, purports to be a paragraph from the answer of His Excellency the Governor to an address presented to him by certain merchants and landholders of the Colony.  The affidavit of Mr. Wentworth further states, that before the publication of the alleged libellous matter, he was induced, ``with a view to bring his said Excellency's conduct in reference to a certain punishment inflicted by His said Excellency's directions, contrary to due course of law, on Joseph Sudds and Patrick Thompson, formerly two soldiers of H. M. 57th regiment of foot, (and which said punishment this deponent verily believes occasioned the premature death of the said Joseph Sudds) under the investigation of some competent tribunal in England to forward a statement of all the circumstances connected with the said punishment of the said Joseph Sudds and Patrick Thompson, to the Right Honourable His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, which statement this deponent is satisfied is referred to, as well in the said address, as in the said reply, under the term ``Impeachment."  And this deponent further says, that in preparing his said statement, he exercised the utmost care and caution as to the facts therein mentioned and relied on.  And this deponent further says, that the said statement or impeachment is not an absurd compound of base and incredible calumnies, but is on the contrary, to the best of this deponent's belief, a sober and indisputable detail of facts and of fair interferences arising from such facts; the truth of which this deponent has offered, and is ready to substantiate before any competent tribunal."  The affidavit then further goes on to state, that ``the alleged address and reply, part of which form the said scandalous defamatory libel, were not published in those columns of the said public newspaper, which are usually appropriated to the publication of official documents emanating from the government, but were prefaced by a leading article in the said public newspaper, which they immediately followed, and which said leading article was and is in the words and figures following: [Mr. Norton here read the whole of the article alluded to, and continued.]  The Court will perceive that the article I have just read contains various comments on this document purporting to be an address and reply; and that certain parts of those preliminary observations are pointed at as shewing that the publisher had a knowledge of an impeachment, and that therefore they were published of and concerning the plaintiff. 

The learned gentleman, however, who made this affidavit knew it to be so very vague that he has sworn only to his belief that the allusions contained in the publications of which he complains were pointed at him, and has bestowed no inconsiderable degree of labour in arguing from a preface in order to affect the defendant with a knowledge that he was the person so alluded to.  But I conceive, and I am sure the Court will be of opinion with me, that he has completely failed in his endeavour, and that he has wandered into a course into which he has been misled, and into which the Court also will be misled without the most careful review of the whole case.  Your Honors will, therefore, read dispassionately the whole of the leading article, and I think I shall have no difficulty in shewing that Mr. Wentworth has altogether fallen into an error.  Mr. Wentworth states, that he found it necessary to write to the Secretary of State, in order to procure an investigation into the conduct of the Governor, touching certain transactions which took place in this Colony; but the defendant was not acquainted with that letter; and, in fact, I shall be able to shew, so far from his ever having seen such a letter, that he did not know that such a letter had been written.  The learned gentleman who makes the present application to the Court has gone too far.  He has fancied, because a certain thing which he did, known only to himself in the Colony, was like an impeachment, that the remarks on a certain other thing, vulgarly called an impeachment, must necessarily apply to his letter -- a letter too, of which the defendant had not only no knowledge, but of no other person in the Colony would have had any knowledge but for the affidavit of the learned gentleman himself.  It were preposterous to suppose that the Court can entertain an application of this nature upon such vague and inconclusive suppositions (for they amount to nothing more) as those contained in the affidavit on which this motion is grounded.  Mr. Wentworth has sworn that he has written a temperate and dispassionate letter, containing a sober and indisputable detail of facts; and it is quite clear, therefore, that this could not be the document referred to by the defendant, in the publication before the Court.  I might fancy, because somebody said Sydney was not without a pettifogging attorney, that I was the individual alluded to; but surely it could only be the fancy of a disordered imagination which could induce the Court to arrive at the same conclusion.  How, I would ask, is it possible that the defendant could have alluded to an instrument of the existence of which he was absolutely ignorant?  If, indeed, Mr. Wentworth, in his affidavit, alludes to the printed document I now hold in my hand, without the name of the author, without even the name of the printer attached to it -- if this indeed be the production to which that gentleman has referred in his affidavit, and which he has designated ``a sober and indisputable statement of facts and fair inferences" -- then I hesitate not to say that he has been guilty of the unwarrantable action of attempting to poison the public mind against the individual he accuses, and endeavouring to prevent, instead of to promote, the ends of justice, by exciting an undue impression against one whose conduct may not come under investigation these twelve months.  If this indeed be the letter to which Mr. Wentworth refers, I will shew that it is not a calm and temperate enquiry, but a vile and infamous publication, in which persons holding the highest offices under the Government are designated by names more foul than those applied by the commonest felons in the gaol to each other.  I cannot, however, conceive that this can be the document referred to by Mr. Wentworth.  I will not do him the injustice to suppose for a moment, that a lawyer, a gentleman who has sworn that he was influenced by what he considered a sacred duty to humanity, and a desire to uphold the supremacy of the British law in this Colony, would be capable of such conduct as to prejudice the mind of the public against an individual whom he was about to accuse.  The learned gentleman, however, takes leave to presume that no person could perform an act of justice or injustice but himself -- of justice in complaining, or injustice in vituperating.  He must think this, or he has no right to suppose that he is the individual alluded to by the defendant.  The learned gentleman may, for aught I know, be hostile to the Governor, but he is not to suppose that known to the Editor of a public journal; nor was the defendant to be timid in expressing his opposition of this publication, through apprehension that it might grate on the feelings of Mr. Wentworth.  Your Honors will therefore perceive, that there is not sufficient on the affidavit in support of this motion, independent of the innuendos, to shew the intention of the defendant, or in any way to point the matter complained of to the applicant; and that the singular coincidence of Mr. Wentworth having penned a temperate and judicious letter to the Secretary of State, at the same period of time when a grossly libellous one was circulated about Sydney, without a name, has induced the learned gentleman to fall into the error of supposing himself alluded to in the remarks which a scurrilous production like that now before me so justly called forth.

In reply to the affidavit of Mr. Wentworth, and feeling the strong delusion with which that gentleman has fallen, as to his knowledge of all those matter detailed by him, the defendant has filed a short affidavit which I will now beg leave to read to the court.  [Mr. Norton here read an affidavit sworn by the defendant in which he denied having seen any such letter as that stated by Mr. Wentworth to have been written by him to the Secretary of State, and declared that the comments complained of had reference to a pamphlet designated an impeachment, which was published in Sydney.  Passages from the pamphlet, which was in the hands of Mr. Norton, were embodied in the affidavit; but they being of so grossly libellous a character on the head of the Government, and some of the chief officers under him, we forebear to insert the affidavit, particularly as the court, in a subsequent stage of the proceedings, cautioned the public Journals against publishing those passages from the pamphlet which were read in open court.]  Your Honors will perceive, from the affidavit, that there was, at the time of the publication, complained of, a thing called an impeachment circulated in Sydney; a publication, as you will have collected from the extracts I have read, obviously calculated to irritate, not tranquillise the public feeling, and to occasion anachy [sic] and misrule instead of the fair and dispationate [sic] enquiry alluded to in the affidavit on the other side.  It was to this publication the defendant referred in his comments and not to the calm and temperate letter of Mr. Wentworth, which was intended merely to precent a repetition of an excess of unwarranted power.  Mr. Wentworth's letter was not an impeachment; but the thing designated as such is called so in the 15th page; a fact which, in reference to the present case, is of rather a singular character.  It is not likely that Mr. Wentworth would allow a publication of his to go forth to the world nameless, without even the name of the printer.  This publication, therefore cannot be his, but must be the act of some other person who took the opportunity to profit by the name and character of Mr. Wentworth, in palming on the world a base and vile pamphlet.  It is clear then, that this is the publication referred to by the defendant and not the letter of Mr. Wentworth, which was not an impeachment, and of which he could know nothing; and I ask the court even from the extracts I have read, whether there could be anything more grossly libellous, or unlike the calm and temperate letter stated to have been written by Mr. Wentworth?  Is this a calm and dispassionate enquiry into the case of Sudds and Thompson?  Is this an enquiry into the conduct of Lieutenant General Darling in certain transactions; containing a sober statement of facts and fair inferences arising therefrom?  It is obvious that this cannot be the publication to which Mr. Wentworth alludes for nothing could have been more justly designated than it has been by the defendant.  I would say if I could bring my mind to Mr. Wentworth? the injustice to suppose for one moment that he was the author of a production so infamous in its character as this, that the observations of the defendant have been temperate indeed.  [The learned counsel here alluded to some passages in the pamphlet, which we dare not publish] surely these are incredible calumnies; and who can deny that so vile a publication carries with it the most convincing proofs of the character and motives of it [sic] author.

Mr. Justice Dowling -- Do you suggest to what extent that printed pamphlet has been circulated, Mr. Norton?

Mr. Norton -- No, your Honor; but I have reason to suppose that it has been seen by a number of persons.  A considerable number of copies, as I understand, were printed. 

Dr. Wardell rose to interrupt the Counsel for the defendant, whom he contended had taken the most singular line of defence that had ever been urged in any Court.  He thought the learned Counsel had been allowed to go on quite far enough, and he must insist upon his sbstaining [sic] from making statements.

Mr. Norton -- I make no statements.  I have no occasion to make any, and I shall leave the defendant's case, with the observations I have urged, merely repeating what I have already stated, and what the defendant has sworn to in his affidavit, that his comments had reference only to the published pamphlet, and that he denies ever having seen any other.

Dr. Wardell, in support of the rule, said, the course of defence taken on this occasion is certainly one of the most singular and irregular I have ever heard adopted in a Court.  The learned gentleman who opposed this motion has been most anxious to avail himself of a two-fold defence, but still fearing to avail himself of either, and undecided whether he would adopt a defence at all.  Fort my own part, I can liken the defence which has been set up to-day, to nothing better than a shying horse which shifts from one side of the road to the other, and starts from each object that is presented to him to the imminent danger of unhorsing the rider, who, if not skilful, commonly comes down as the learned gentleman on the other side has done to-day.  He lays hold of the pamphlet he has got before him for his nag, and mounting on it will not have Mr. Wentworth for the author, but that won't do.  He then lugs that gentleman is as the author, but finds that won't do; and thus his nag, refusing to proceed either at one side of the road or the other, has at last finished the altercation by leaving his rider in the mire.  It has been argued that the pamphlet does not contain a sober, dispassionate statement of the transactions to which it is said to refer, and that, therefore, the defendant was warranted in designating it as he had done.  But the pamphlet has nothing whatever to do with this case; and even if it had, much more must have been shewn before it could be rendered available as a defence.  Assuming that pamphlet to be the production of Mr. Wentworth, how, I would ask, does the defendant derive his authority to libel Mr. Wentworth, because he chooses to write a pamphlet not directed to him, or to avail himself of the illegal act of one party, in matters totally distinct from him, to commit an illegal act himself?  The pamphlet is either legal or illegal.  If it be illegal, that was not the mode of assailing the author; if legal, the defence fails.  But the defendant, in coming before the Court, does not venture to swear, either that the pamphlet is Mr. Wentworth's, or that in his publication he did not intend to allude to that gentleman as the author of the impeachment.  He says that his remarks were intended to apply to a certain pamphlet, but I ask the Court, looking at the pamphlet, whether the remarks in the leading article are a review of that publication.  They are anything but a commentary; and when the Court remembered that the most libellous passages sworn to were contained in a reply to something from a third party, it could not view the defence set up as anything but a shuffling attempt to avoid the consequences of an illegal act by misleading the Court, in inducing it to consider the defendant as the author of the publication complained of, instead of the willing instrument of another.  The defendant's affidavit had no reference whatever to the case, the libellous passages complained of not being framed by him, but being as he himself averred, part of a reply to the address presented to another party.  What the defendant had seen or heard, therefore, was nothing  to the purpose.  He would have the Court believe that he had met with the pamphlet, and not knowing the author, had merely given his honest sentiments of it.  If this had really been so, he would have stood or fallen on different grounds; but in the publication complained of the public are told nothing of a pamphlet.  But assuming this pamphlet to be Mr. Wentworth's, what proof is there before the Court that it was published at his instance, or that it was not vamped up and printed by the defendant himself from some written document?  I for one, and I I [sic] think I know something of these matters, will say that I never saw, either printed or written, any pamphlet, containing matter such as has been read to-day.  But I will suppose such a pamphlet written and printed.  If it were printed for the purpose set forth in Mr. Wentworth's affidavit -- if an impeachment had been printed, your Honors are aware that there is a case in Saunders precisely in point.  If it were intended for an impeachment it would only be putting printed documents in the hands of persons instead of written ones.  But, I ask, what proof is there that Mr. Wentworth is the author of this pamphlet?  Or where is the proof that he is not the party alluded to in the publication of which he complains?  He appears before the public, an innocent party assailed in the columns of a newspaper, not in his own opinion only, for there is another affidavit in support of this motion which goes to shew that it is the public opinion also.  What then, I would put it to the Court, have we here but an ordinary case of application for an information against a party for publishing an article of libellous character sworn to allude to the complainant?  In the present case, the publication is too obviously libellous to require me to press it further upon your Honor's consideration; the next point therefore is with reference to its application to Mr. Wentworth.  Of this, I submit, there can be no doubt whatever.  Mr. Wentworth swears that it applies exclusively to him, and his affidavit is corroborated by another, which puts the matter beyond dispute.  But does the defendant reply, and say that he did not mean Mr. Wentworth as the author of the impeachment?  No; he endeavours to shield himself by attempting to shew that Mr. Wentworth published a pamphlet against somebody else.  Indeed he does not even aver so much, for he has not stated how that pamphlet came into his possession, or that he may no be the author, printer, and publisher of it himself, and thereby guilty of all those acts of illegality of which he complains.  I therefore submit to your Honors, that the matter complained of is grossly libellous, and clearly alludes to the complainant; the publication is not denied by the defendant, neither has he sworn that he did not allude to the complainant.  He has , in fact, set up no defence except that he had seen a pamphlet of some description.  Mr. Wentworth has sworn, that the statement written by him was temperate and dispassionate, and that he is alluded to by the passage in the publication of which he complains.  The defendant does not venture to swear that he is not alluded to, and I therefore contend, that this is a sufficient and unanswered case on the part of the defendant, and that he is enabled to have this rule made absolute, particularly as this is the ordinary remedy, in the absence of a Grand Jury, to which he can resort, and as he has shewn sufficient grounds to warrant a Grand Jury, if it were in existence in the Colony, in finding a bill.  In fact, to refuse applications of this nature, where a reasonable prima facuie case is presented to the Court, would be a denial of justice , under the present state of the law.  For these reasons, as well as on the merits of the case, as they appear upon the affidavits in support of this motion, and not contradicted on the other side, I submit that the complainant is entitled to have the rule made absolute.

The Chief Justice -- We are of the opinion, that in this case the rule should be made absolute.  Upon reading the affidavits on which the rule was granted it appeared to us that the matter complained of was clearly libellous, and that the only question was as to its application.  We therefore granted the conditional order to enable the defendant to come before the Court and relieve himself of the charges made against him in the affidavits filed in support of the motion.  We do not, however, after hearing the argument and the affidavit of the defendant, find a sufficient answer to the present application.  The defendant's affidavit does not deny that the allusions in the publication complained of have reference to the complainant; it only states that they were meant to apply to the author of a certain pamphlet.  We cannot go into the question of who is the author of that pamphlet, but even to attribute to any one that he is the author of matter so grossly libellous as it appears to be, is itself a libel.  This Court, with reference to cases like the present, is not sitting like the Court of King's Bench in England, but as a Grand Jury.  We have simply to see if the matter charged as libellous will bear the interpretation put upon it: if it will bear such interpretation, then there is the basis of an offence laid against somebody, and we are bound to grant the application, in order to send the case before a competent tribunal to decide whether the charge is established or not.  In making these remarks, we would observe that a certain pamphlet has been referred to, and passages quoted from it by the defendant's counsel, of so grossly libellous a character against the head of the Government in this Colony, and other individuals connected with the Government, that we would caution the conductors of the public Journals against publishing those passages, as they would be rendered liable to the severest penalties for so doing.

Rule made Absolute.



[1 ]See Sydney Gazette, 3 October 1829, for another report of this hearing.  The judges were reluctant to accept an application on the last day of term, but Forbes C.J. and Stephen J. accepted it on the basis of a precedent, while Dowling J. objected.   See also Australian, 2 December 1829; Sydney Gazette, 3 December 1829, for preliminary hearings in this case.  The trial itself was held in June, 1830: see R v Mansfield (No 1), 1830.

See also Australian, 23 September 1829, on a libel prosecution of Mansfield initiated by Hall, the editor of the Monitor.  On these cases and the planned impeachment of the governor, see C.H. Currey, Sir Francis Forbes: the First Chief Justice of New South Wales, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1968, ch. 33.  See also R. v. Hall (No. 6), 1829.

Wentworth's letter to Murray (1 March 1829) stating the impeachment case against the governor, is at Historical Records of Australia, Series 1, Vol. 14, pp 800-859.  He emphasised the Sudds and Thompson case (as to which, see Transportation Opinion, 1826) and its consequences.  He even alleged that Darling was guilty of murder (pp 835, 853).  On the planned impeachment, see also Australian, 1 April, 6 May 1831; Australian, 31 August, 7 September 1832.

For Governor Darling's response to the threatened impeachment, see Darling to Murray, 24 March 1829, Historical Records of Australia, Series 1, Vol. 14, pp 690-692: he considered it the act of a "Factious Party, and a very small one too, consisting only of three or four disreputable and discontented Radical Lawyers".  Darling's most detailed defence is at Historical Records of Australia, Series 1, Vol. 14, pp 793-800.   See also see Darling to Murray, 20 April 1829, Historical Records of Australia, Series 1, Vol. 14, pp 713-714; Darling to Secretary of State, 28 May 1829, Mitchell Library, A 1267, Reel CY 902, Part 4, p. 312K; Darling to Twiss, 7 July 1829, Historical Records of Australia, Series 1, Vol. 15, pp 70-75, and see p. 82 (enclosing supporting documents by the principal landholders and merchants of the colony).  On the treatment of the Sudds and Thompson case in England, see also Sydney Gazette, 24 and 31 October, 19 November, 3 December 1828.

Darling sent another despatch to Murray on 27 July 1830, once again defending himself: Historical Records of Australia, Series 1, Vol. 15, pp 626-627.

Darling left Sydney in 1831: Sydney Herald, 24 October 1831.  Amazingly, the Australian of 25 November 1831, accused him of murdering Sudds when reporting another murder case.  On 31 May 1833, the Australian reported a letter from Hume in England to W.C. Wentworth, saying that Wentworth was needed in England to bring the Sudds case to the attention of the reformed parliament.  Hume and the Australian both said that people in the colony needed to be in control of their own affairs rather than the Colonial Office.  There was some talk of Wentworth going to Westminster to represent New South Wales.  Eventually, a parliamentary inquiry into Darling's actions led to a finding that there was no evidence of him being in the wrong: Australian, 19 January 1836.  See also Australian, 5 and 19 February, 4 March 1835, and 27 May 1836 (letter); Sydney Herald, 18 February 1836.

For another alleged attempt to commit a crime in order to escape from the army, see R. v. Mann and Fulham, Sydney Gazette, 6 February 1835, and see Australian, 10 February 1835.

[2 ] See also, Australian, 23 December 1829.  For accounts of proceedings on 12 December 1829, see Sydney Gazette, 15 December 1829; Australian, 16 December 1829.

Published by the Division of Law, Macquarie University