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Colonial Cases

Pitts v. La Fontaine, 1880

[jurisdiction over land within Ottoman empire - insolvency]

Pitts v. La Fontaine

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
20 April 1880
Source: The Times, 21 April 1880

 

LAW REPORT, April 20.

JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL.

(Present - Sir JAMES COLVILLE, Sir BARNES PEACOCK, Sir MONTAGUE SMITH, and Sir  ROBERT COLLIER.)

PITTS v. LA FONTAINE.

This was an appeal, from a decision of the late Sir Philip Francis, the Judge of the Supreme Court at Constantinople, of the 18th of July, 1874, and from certain subsequent judgments of Mr. J. H. Fawcett, the present Consul-General.  By the orders in question certain real estate situated at the Island of Prinkipo, in the Sea of Marmora, and within the limits of the Ottoman Empire, was directed to be sold, and the appeal was as to the jurisdiction of the Consular Court to make such orders and upon kindred matters connected with the suit.

Mr. Benjamin, Q.C., and Mr. Hornell were counsel for the appellant; Mr. Butt, Q.C., and Mr. Biron for the respondent.

The arguments of counsel were not finished when the Court rose for the day, and will be resumed to-morrow (Wednesday) morning.

 

Source: The Times, 22 April 1880

LAW REPORT, 22 April 1880

JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL.

PITTS v. LA FONTAINE.

This was an appeal from an order of the late Sir Philip Francis, the Judge of the Supreme Consular Court at Constantinople, of the 18th of July, 1874, and from certain subsequent decisions of Mr. J. H. Fawcett, the present Consul-General.

Mr. Benjamin, Q.C., and Mr. Hornell were counsel for the appellant; Mr. Butt, Q.C., and Mr. Frank Stafford for the respondent.

Up to 1874, the appellant, Mr. Pitts, carried on business as a miller and baker at the Island of Prinkipo, in the Sea of Marmora, within the limits of the Ottoman Empire, and the premises consisted of a steam flour mill and a separate and adjacent building containing two hand ovens and a bakery.  The mill was built in 1860 by the appellant, in conjunction with Messrs. T. B. Morton and Co., ship-owners and chandlers, and it was worked jointly by them, each of the four partners taking an equal share of the profits. At that time foreigners were incapacitated from holding land in Turkey, and as the appellant and two of his three partners were British subjects, the property was purchased in the name of the wife of the other partner, Mr. Petrocochino, who happened to be a Turkish lady.  In 1868, Mr. Petrocochino died, and his widow married his partner, the appellant, who thenceforward took one-half of the profits of the concern in his own right and that of his wife.

In 1873 Messrs. Morton and Co. became insolvent, and the respondent, Mr. Edward La Fontaine, who had been appointed trustee of their estate, applied to the Consular Court to decree that the property owned by them and the appellant should be sold for the interests of the creditors.  The appellant opposed the sale, on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction over landed property in Turkey; but that opposition was overruled, and the property was sold to Mr. Constantinidis, a Greek merchant.  The Sublime Porte, on the application of the Sheik-ul-islam, ordered the transfer of the property to the vendor; but the appellant and his wife still demurred, and they were ultimately ejected from the property.

The litigation went on for some time longer, and at length the appellant took steps to lay his case before Her Majesty in Council, contending that the Consular Court had no power to order the sale.

At the conclusion of the arguments,

Their LORDSHIPS reserved judgment.

 

Source: The Times, 12 May 1880

LAW REPORT, May 11.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

(Present - The LORD CHANCELLOR, Lord HATHERLEY, and Lord BLACKBURN.)

PITTS v. LA FONTAINE.

This was an important appeal from an order of the late Sir Philip Francis, the Judge of the Supreme Consular Court at Constantinople, of the 18th of July, 1874, and from certain subsequent decisions of Mr. John Henry Fawcett, the present Consul-General.

Mr. Benjamin, Q.C., and Mr. Hornell were counsel for the applicant; Mr. Butt, Q.C., and Mr. Frank Stafford for the respondent.

The circumstances were peculiar.  In and for some time previous to the year 1874 the appellant, Mr. Joseph Pitts, carried on business as a miller, baker, and contractor for the supply of bread, biscuits, and farinaceous food at the Island of Prinkipo, in the Sea of Marmora, within the limits of the Ottoman Empire.  His premises consisted of a stream flour mill and a separate building containing two hand ovens and a bakery.  The mill was built in 1860 by Mr. Pitts, in conjunction with Messrs. Morton, Petrocochino, and Bell, who carried on business aw ship-owners and chandlers, and the premises were fitted with machinery at their joint expense and the business conducted on a joint account, the appellant taking one-fourth of the profits.  At that time foreigners were incapacitated from holding land in Turkey, and accordingly the land was bought and building erected in the name of Madame Petrocochino, who was a Turkish lady.  In 1868 Mr. Petrocochino died, and the appellant, Mr. Pitts, married his widow.  The profits of the firm were then equally divided, the appellant and his wife taking one half and the other two surviving parties the remainder.

This state of things continued until August, 1873, when the appellant's partners effected an arrangement by composition with their creditors under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, and the respondent, Mr. La Fontaine, was appointed trustee of their estate.  At that date the appellant was in actual possession of and working the mill, and on their suspending payment he rendered an account to the trustee showing that the capital of the firm originally embarked in the mill and intrusted to him to manage and their share of the profits had been paid to his partners.  That account was accepted as satisfactory, and the appellant continued to work the mill on his own account.  The separate building, containing the two ovens, was erected in 1872 by the appellant for his own use and benefit, with the consent of his partners, though they had no interest whatever in it.

In April, 1874, a suit was instituted by the respondent, Mr. la Fontaine, in his capacity as trustee, against Mrs. Potts, in whose name, being as has been stated, a Turkish lady, the property stood, for the purpose of enforcing the sale of the land and mill, and of paying out the three-fourths of the proceeds. The appellant and his wife demurred to the Court's jurisdiction on the ground that the subject-matter was landed property in the Turkish Empire.  This was overruled by the then Judge, Sir Philip Francis.  After the suit was commenced the four daughters of Mr. Petrocochino instituted legal proceedings against their mother, Mrs. Pitts, in the court of the Sheik-ul-Islam, the Turkish tribunal having jurisdiction over the estate, and that Court decided that three-fourths of the mill and the land were the property of the daughters.

On the 18th of July, 1874, Sir Philip Francis directed a sale of the property, with costs against the appellant's wife.  The sale was advertised, but it was not till October, 1876, that the Turkish authorities consented to assist in carrying out the sale.  In November, 1876, Consul Fawcett made an order directing the appellant and his wife to comply with the demand of the Turkish Court, and in spite of their strong opposition three-fourths of the mill were sold to Mr. George Constantinidis, a Greek subject, on behalf of a Mr. Homere, to whom the partners had mortgaged their shares.  In March, 1878, an order was made by the Consular Court to eject Mrs. Pitts from the mill, and  formal possession was given to Mt. Constantinidis, though the appellant continued to hold and work the property.

Two months later, the Consular Court, on the application of the trustee, ordered the closing of the mill, but no notice if the application, it was alleged, had been given to either the appellant or his wife.  At that date the appellant was under contract to supply bread to the British troops stationed at San Stefano and to the British fleet at anchor off the island, and he had large quantities of flour and grain in the mill.  The order of the Court was served on Mrs. Pitts, but not on the appellant, though to save time he took cognizance of it by moving the Court to set it aside.  That motion was refused, as also was a request for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, and on the 28th of June, 1878, Mr. Constantinidis, with an officer of the Court, went to the mill, stopped the machinery, ejected the appellant, and sealed up the premises. A few days later the appellant applied to the Court to set free the machinery and to have it placed in proper hands pending the proceedings; but this request was not granted.

Application was then made to the Turkish authorities for assistance, but it came to nothing.  The litigation continuer some time longer, and in the course of it the Judge (Mr. Fawcett) sentenced the appellant to a fine of £100 and six weeks' imprisonment for contempt of Court in taking possession of the separate building; but he was released after 16 days' detention, on payment of £25.  Eventually, the appellant obtained leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, contending that the Consular Court had no jurisdiction to order the sale.

Their LORDSHIPS, in giving judgment, said it was admitted that the appellant had established his right to some relief in respect of the extraordinary and complicated proceedings of the Supreme Consular Court, which were the subject of the appeal, and the question which the Judicial Committee had reserved for consideration was what relief - having regard to the peculiar nature of the case, the limited powers of the Consular Court over that subject-matter, and the rights which otter parties had acquired - they would recommend Her Majesty to grant.  Without dwelling on the minor irregularities which might be pointed out in many of the proceedings and orders, their Lordships had to observe that, in so far as they affected or purported to affect the one-fourth share of the appellant and his rights therein, or were directed to an end which culminated in the expulsion of the appellant from the mill, they were all open to the fatal objection that they were made in a suit in which he was not a party and in which many of the issues which they purported to decide could not properly be raised.  The Court had no power to sell the one-fourth share belonging to the appellant, or to eject him out of actual possession of that share of the mill.  Any question that might exist or arise between him and the new purchaser of the three-fourths share as to their respective rights in the joint property ought to have been determined in a suit between them, properly formed, and instituted in a proper tribunal.

It appeared to their Lordships that Constantinidis, instead of litigating the question fairly, had sought to get them indirectly determined in his favour by proceedings taken in the Consular Court in the name of the respondent; that the respondent had, from some motive or another, become his instrument, and lent himself to that course of action; and that the Consular Court had improperly sanctioned it by the orders in question.  The appellant had suffered grievous wrong by reason of these irregular proceedings, and unquestionably he had been wrongfully put out of possession of his property in a country in which a British subject was likely to experience peculiar difficulties in regaining the possession of which he had been wrongfully deprived; and, in addition, his moveable goods had been damaged.

It was, unhappily, impossible for the Lordships to give him full and adequate relief.  They could not, having regard to the power of the Turkish authorities over the land, and to the fact that Constantinidis was not subject to the jurisdiction of the British Consular Court, absolutely direct the restitution of possession, and still less could they deal with the question of damage done to moveable property.  But their Lordships would humbly recommend Her Majesty to set aside the orders of the 18th of July, 1874, and the 27th of March, 1878, so far as they affected the interest of the appellant in the Prinkipo property, or directed the payment of costs by his wife. 

All the orders subsequent to the 27th of March, 1878, were irregular and improper and must be set aside.  The appellant, or his wife, must be restored to the possession of the one-fourth share of the Prinkipo properly, but without prejudice to any question between him and Constantinidis, the purchaser of the other three-fourths, or any person claiming by virtue of the sale, and the Consular Court must take all necessary proceedings to effect such restitution.  All costs of the proceedings paid by the appellant or his wife must be refunded, and the appellant must be at liberty to take such proceedings as he might be advised against the respondent, or others to obtain restitution o the property or to recover damages.  The appellant must have his costs in the Consular Court and in that appeal.

Source: The Morning Post (London), 13 May 1880

LAW INTELLIGENCE.

JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL.

WEDNESDAY.

(Sittings before Sir J. Colville, Sir B. Peacock, Sir M. Smith, and Sir R. Collier.)

PITTS v. LA FONTANE.

This case, from the Consular Court of Constantinople, in which their Lordships gave judgment on Tuesday, came before the court to be settled on the minutes before the proceedings were remitted to the Consular Court, with declarations as to the reply of the appellant, who had been fined and imprisoned for the disobedience of orders which their Lordships now declared to have been illegally made.  Sir Philip Francis, the late judge of the Consular Court, and his successor, Mr. Fawcett, had made orders against Mr. Pitts and condemned him in costs, besides sending him to prison.  Their Lordships held that the appellant had been wrongfully treated, and would declare his rights and order restitution, with costs.

Mr. Hornell attended for the appellant, and Mr. Frank Stafford for the respondent.

Their Lordships varied the order made on the judgment with a further declaration of the rights of the appellant with all costs.

Source: The Times, 15 November 1880

LAW REPORT, Nov. 18.

JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL.

(Present - SIR JAMES COLVILLE, SIR MONTAGUE SMITH, and SIR ROBERT COLLIER.)

PITTS V. LA FONTAINE.

This was a petition for a peremptory order calling upon the respondent, Mr. Edward La Fontaine, to pay the costs of an appeal decided against him by their Lordships in May last.  The case was originally before the Consular Court at Constantinople, whose decree in favour of the respondent was reversed on appeal, with costs.  The respondent was trustee of an estate in liquidation, and he now demurred to pay the costs, which amounted to £698 in all, except from the estate, in which it appeared there was not sufficient money to meet them.  The order, however, was made upon him personally.  The Consular Court had upheld Mr. La Fontaine, and refused to enforce the order of their Lordships, and the appellant, who had been successful on appeal, now petitioned for a peremptory order in the matter so as to obtain his costs.

Mr. Benjamin, Q.C., and Mr. Hornell were counsel for the appellant, Mr. F. Stafford for the respondent.

Mr. STAFFORD, on the strength of a telegram from the respondent from Constantinople, stating that fresh documents were on their way, applied for a postponement of the hearing of the petition for a fortnight.

Mr. BENJAMIN opposed the application, stating that the proceedings in the Consular Court had been most improper and irregular, and their Lordships' order, as to which there was no doubt, had been defied.  The Judge (Mr. Fawcett) kept the appellant waiting for two months until a particular counsel returned to Constantinople, and then coolly said that he did not believe their Lordships had intended to make such an order, and declined to enforce it.

Their LORDSHIPS said as the application for postponement had been made it might be better for all parties that there should be no appearance of hurrying on the case.  The petition would, therefore, be definitely fixer to be heard on Saturday, the 27th inst.

Mr. BENJAMIN said he supposed the respondent in any case must pay the costs incurred by that adjournment.

Their LORDSHIPS said they would decide that point at the hearing of the petition.

 

Source: The Times, 22 November 1880

LAW REPORT, Nov. 20.

JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL.

(Present - SIR JAMES COLVILLE, SIR MONTAGUE SMITH, and SIR ROBERT COLLIER.)

PITTS v. LA FONTAINE.

This was an important and remarkable petition for a peremptory order to compel the Judger of the Consular Court at Constantinople to carry into execution an Order in Council embodying a judgment of their Lordships pronounced in the 19th of May last in this suit.  By that Order in Council the Consular Court was directed to issue execution against the respondent, Mr. Edward La Fontaine, in respect of the costs of an appeal to the Judicial Committee which had been decided against him, and, further, to tax the costs in the prior proceedings in the Consular Court, and to issue execution in respect of them also. The respondent, Mr. La Fontaine, was the trustee of the liquidation of the affairs of Messrs. T. B. Morton and Co.  The Judge (Mr. Fawcett), who is also Her Majesty's Consul-General, took upon himself to decide that the Order was wrong, and that Mr. La Fontaine was not personally responsible for the costs.

Mr. Hornell (with whom was Mr. Benjamin, Q.C., appeared for the appellant; Mr. Lumley Smith, Q.C., and Mr. F. Stafford for the respondent.

Mr. HORNELL said that the petition was one of a curious and, fortunately, unusual nature - namely, to compel the Court below, by a peremptory order, to carry into effect their Lordships' judgment of the 19th of May, reversing the decision of the Consular Court, and directing the respondent, Mr. la Fontaine, to pay to the appellant the costs of the proceedings in that Court, and of the appeal.  Those costs amounted to £698 odd.  In pursuance of their Lordships' judgment, the appellant, on the 10th of August last, moved the Consular Court to carry the order for costs into execution.  The Judge (Mr. Fawcett) thought fit to grant a rule nisi, returnable on the 16th of August, and when it came on to be argued he summarily postponed the hearing until the respondent's counsel had returned to Constantinople.  On October 4 the appellant again applied to the Court for execution, and the rule came on for argument next day.  It was then contended on behalf of Mr. La Fontaine, the respondent, that he was simply a trustee in liquidation, and, as such, was only bound to pay the costs out of the estate.  The costs, as he said, amounted to £698, but the estate had only £220 wherewith to meet them. 

The Judge finally determined that it was never intended by the Order that Mr. La Fontaine should pay the costs, except out of the estate, and he discharged the rule.  The appellant now sought, by his petition, a preemptory order upon the Consular Court to carry into execution the terms of their Lordships' judgment.

Mr. LUMLEY SMITH, Q.C., who appeared for Mr. La Fontaine, said his client was the respondent in a suit which was first set on foot by the late Sir Philip Francis, the then Judge of the Consular Court.  Their Lordships had made no order that the costs should be paid by him personally.  Their judgment was silent as to whether he was to be personally liable or only as trustee.  Their Lordships were now asked to give an opinion and to explain what were the meaning and intention of the order.

SIR MONTAGUE SMITH said the Judge of the Consular Court had gone further than that, for he had refused to carry out the order except in a particular way in which he had interpreted it.

Mr. LUMLEY SMITH said that the position of Mr.  La Fontaine in the matter was this: - His debt was the trifling sum of £44, but, having resided in Constantinople a long time, and, being held in high esteem, he allowed himself to be made the trustee of the estate, stipulating that he should not act without the direction of the consular Court in every step.

SIR MONTAGUE SMITH said there was no proof that any direction had been given by the Court to institute the various proceedings, and certainly there had been no formal order of the Court to that effect.

MR. LUMLEY SMITH said the case in its inception had been complicated by a mixing up of the rights of British and Turkish subjects in the matter.  Mr. Stavrides, the dragoman of the British Embassy, had given his opinion to Sir Philip Francis that the Consular Court was the proper tribunal to deal with the case, and Sir Philip Francis accordingly, and verbally, directed to proceedings to be instituted in that court.  The case of "Ex parte Stapleton" (10 "Law Reports," Chancery Division, 586) went to prove that a trustee in bankruptcy who was the respondent in a successful appeal would not be ordered to pay the costs personally.  Their Lordships, in the present instance, were never asker to make the trustee liable, and the Judge concluded, accordingly, that such was not their intention in their judgment.  By the 20th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, it was provided that the trustee should, in relation to and for the purpose of acquiring or retaining possession of the property of the bankrupt, be in the same position in all respects was if he wert a receiver of such property appointed by the Court of Chancery. The position of a receiver, he contended, was virtually that of an officer of thee Court, and he acted as such under the direction and protection of the Court.  It might very well be that Mr. La Fontaine had not received his directions in the manner known to the English Courte, but he might still have done so in accordance with the practise of the Consular Court.  He argued that Mr. La Fontaine ought not to be made to pay the costs personally.  By the 25th section of the Bankruptcy Act the trustee was empowered to bring or defend any action or suit or other legal proceeding relating to the property of the bankrupt, and by the 83d section the trustee might sue or be sued by his official name as trustee of the bankrupt's property, and by that name might hold property of every description, and make contracts, and so on.

SIR JAMES COLVILLE said in the case or "Ex parte Stapleton," which the learned counsel had quoted, the trustee was not the appellant, and the circumstances were in no way parallel with those in the present case.

MR. HORNELL cited the case of "Ex parte Angerstein," (9 "Law Reports," Chancery Appeals, 479), in which it was decided that if a trustee in bankruptcy made an unsuccessful application to the Court, he would, in the absence or special circumstances, be ordered to pay the costs, and if the estate was insufficient the trustee must bear them personally.

MR. LUMLEY SMITH said Mr. La Fontaine believed he was acting under the order of the Court.  He (Mr. Smith) contended that in point of fact it was proved that Sir Philip Francis gave directions to the trustee to commence the suit.

SIR MONTAGUE SMITH said the original suit was followed by an immense number of proceedings, many of them most irregular, to say the least of i.

MR. LUMLEY SMITH urged that their Lordships had expressed no opinion in their order that Mr. la Fontaine should personally pay the costs.  At all events, the Judge had understood the order in that sense, and he (Mr. Smith) asked them to say that they meant that there was to be no personal liability on Mr. La Fontaine's part.

SIR JAMES COLVILLE, in giving the judgment of their Lordships, said they were asked to address a peremptory order to the Consular Court of Constantinople to carry into execution the Order in Council of the 19th of May last as far as it directed that the respondent (Mr. La Fontaine) should pay certain costs to the appellant.  There seemed to have been in the course of the recent proceedings in the Consular Court a good deal or loose and irregular discussion as to the nature of the order, the powers of the Judicial Committee, and so on.  Suffice it to say that an order of that Tribunal (The Judicial Committee) when sanctioned and embodied in an Order in Council became a decree of the final Court of Appeal, the House of Lords having no jurisdiction in such a matter.  Unit became, therefore, the duty of every subordinate tribunal to whom such an order was addressed to carry it into execution.  Their Lordships could not think the Judge of the Consular Court intended to violate the first principle of that kind, or. At any rate, to violate it wilfully.

Now, as to the order itself, was there the least ambiguity in its terms?  It directed the respondent to pay the appellant all such costs as were incurred in the Consular Court by him or his wife of and incidental to all the orders under appeal, or of opposing the rules in which such orders were made, except the costs of the rules of the 7th of January and the order of the 5th of February, 1878, made thereon, such costs to be taxed by the Consular Court, and the respondent to pay the costs of such appeal.  Nothing could be clearer on the face of the order than that it was a direction to the respondent personally to pay the costs.

The next point that arose was whether the ratio decidendi of the Judge of the Consular Court in dismissing the appellant's application could be upheld - namely, that all the proceedings having been taken with the sanction and at the instance of Sir Philip Francis, formerly the judge of that Court, and having regard to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, it would be so irregular and contrary to law to make the respondent personally liable that it must be presumed that their Lordships intended that the costs should be pair out of the estate, and only so far as the estate was sufficient to meet them.  In regard to the suggestion of the effect of any directions given by Sir Philip Francis, it appeared to their Lordships that those directions had not been established.  All that seemed to have transpired was that Sir Philip Francis had been regularly, or rather irregularly, consulted by the legal adviser of the respondent as to what proceedings should be taken to realize the bankrupt's interests in the property in question, that Sir Philip Francis had previously consulted the dragoman of the Embassy on the point, and that Sir Philip advised the respondent's lawyer to bring the action in the Consular Court.

As far as that gave sanction to the institution of proceedings for the realization of the insolvents' estate, though there was some irregularity in bringing the suit against Mrs. Pitts, without joining her husband in the action, there was little to complain of.  But there were subsequently instituted a series of irregular proceedings against the appellant to remove him from his partnership in the property with the bankrupts, and to exclude him from his share of the proceeds.  No sanction whatever had been given to those particular proceedings by Sir Philip Francis, as they were taken some time after his death; and they could only be properly proved to have been sanctioned by the production of the formal order of the Court.  On the contrary, the sanction had been attempted to be proved by loose affidavits of alleged conversations between the Judge, the respondent's lawyers, and others, many of whom were dead.

In regard to the contention as to the construction of the Bankruptcy Act, could it be seriously argued that in no case could a trustee under the Act be made personally liable for costs in an unsuccessful appeal?  It seemed to their Lordships that the law, as would reasonably have been expected, went entirely the other way.  In every case of the kind the subsequent question might arise whether the trustee, having to pay the costs of an unsuccessful appeal, might not be entitled to recoup himself from the estate; and in this instance it might be that, if the estate was solvent, Mr. La Fontaine would be allowed hereafter to charge the costs against it; but that was a matter which was not before their Lordships, and upon which they expressed no opinion one way or the other.  It was no reason, however, for depriving the appellant or the benefit of their Lordships' order for the payment of his costs by the respondent. 

Finally, it was perfectly clear by the order itself, in which there was not the slightest ambiguity that the respondent was to be held personally responsible for the costs.  It might be that Mr. La Fontaine was a highly respectable person, and that he had acted in the most bona fide manner throughout the proceedings.  His personal liability was his misfortune, but still it was no ground for withholding the appellant from the costs to which he had been put in the irregular proceedings instituted against him.

Their Lordships would therefore make a peremptory order on the Consular Court to carry into execution the Order in Council directing the payment of the costs by the respondent personally to the appellant.  The respondent must also pay the costs incident to that application.

Source: The Morning Post (London), 22 November 1880

LAW INTELLIGENCE.

JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL. - SATURDAY.

(Before Sir J. Colville, Sir M. Smith, and Sir Robert Collier.)

PITTS v. LE FONTAINE.

In this case, which was in the Consular Court at Constantinople, an application was made for a preemptory order to enforce payment of costs against a liquidator.  Mr. Fawcett, the judge, had refused to enforce the order of the Judicial Committee calling on the defendant to pay the costs, and said the name of the Queen was a "mere form."

The present application was for a peremptory order for the costs to be paid, and that the judge obeys the order of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.  It seemed that the judge was not inclined to make the defendant "personally liable" when there were not sufficient funds in the estate in liquidation. ...

In the course of the discussion some strong remarks were made on the disobedience of the order.

Sir James Colville gave the opinion of their Lordships, calling on the judge to enforce the order already made, and added the costs of the present application.

The order now made was peremptory for payment.

Published by Centre for Comparative Law, History and Governance at Macquarie Law School